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Publicly supported universal pre-kindergarten (“UPK”) is an im-
portant current education policy initiative, promising to improve equita-
ble access to high-quality early education. New York State has long sup-
ported early education. In 1997, the New York State Legislature passed a 
UPK law designed to help bring pre-kindergarten (“pre-K”) education to 
all four-year-olds in the state.1 A lack of adequate funding, however, sty-
mied the ability to serve even half of eligible four-year-olds, particularly 
those in lower income groups and in New York City.2 In 2013, New York 
City mayoral candidate Bill de Blasio made UPK an education priority, 
announcing a plan to make high-quality UPK available to all four-year-
olds and then implementing that plan as mayor.3 This commitment to 
high-quality UPK was bolstered by a 2014 amendment to New York 
State’s UPK law, providing more funding and requiring research-based 
quality standards and robust oversight.4 For UPK to fulfill its promise to 
improve educational attainment and close opportunity gaps, extensive re-
search shows that high-quality, meaningful oversight is essential.5 
Achieving such quality goals is challenging when multiple providers are 
needed to bring programs to scale, and it has proven particularly challeng-
ing in an education policy environment favoring privatization, de-regula-
tion, and school choice.6 New York’s Charter Schools Act, passed in 
 
 1 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3602-e (McKinney 2019). 
 2 See N.Y. STATE SENATE MAJORITY COAL. FIN. COMM., FINANCE COMMITTEE / COUNSEL 
STAFF ANALYSIS OF FY 2015 EXECUTIVE BUDGET 169-70 (2015), https://perma.cc/9A7K-
QMRK; Press Release, Former N.Y. State Senator Jeffrey D. Klein, Senate Co-Leader Jeff 
Klein and Senator Diane Savino Urge State to Approve Mayor de Blasio’s Universal Pre-K 
Plan (Jan. 5, 2014), https://perma.cc/J7W4-9DF2. 
 3 Rebecca Mead, The Lessons of Mayor Bill de Blasio’s Universal Pre-K Initiative, NEW 
YORKER (Sept. 7, 2017), https://perma.cc/TX6S-RMMQ. 
 4 See N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3602-ee (McKinney 2019). 
 5 Natalie Gomez-Velez, Can Universal Pre-K Overcome Extreme Race and Income Seg-
regation to Reach New York’s Neediest Children? The Importance of Legal Infrastructure and 
the Limits of the Law, 63 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 319 (2015). 
 6 Mike Stivers, The Promise of Universal Pre-K, JACOBIN (Sept. 8, 2016), https://
perma.cc/SR3S-FMBV. 
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1998, permits approved charter schools to provide kindergarten through 
grade 12 instruction under the terms of their charters with very little reg-
ulation.7 The 2014 UPK law authorizes school districts to obtain state 
grants to provide pre-K programming, working with both public schools 
and a variety of partners including non-profit organizations, community-
based organizations, private schools, and charter schools.8 Assuring high-
quality and broad access to UPK in New York—as the 2014 legislation 
intended by engaging a range of providers, including charter schools—is 
difficult as a policy and practical matter. 
In Matter of DeVera v. Elia, a majority of the New York State Court 
of Appeals compounded the policy and practical difficulties. Rejecting 
the state and city education departments’ interpretations harmonizing 
New York State’s UPK and Charter School Laws, it decided that charter 
schools are exempt from the New York UPK law’s robust quality and 
oversight standards.9 The decision is based on an oversimplified and 
blinkered reading of a single provision of the UPK law, privileging char-
ter school autonomy over UPK quality measures. But DeVera is troubling 
not only because of its UPK policy implications. It may also represent an 
ill-advised departure from settled doctrines of statutory interpretation that 
call for interpreting statutory schemes as a whole, and for harmonizing 
apparently inconsistent provisions to most closely effectuate legislative 
intent. It also eschews the education agencies’ experience and expertise 
in interpreting and implementing a complex statutory scheme that they 
are charged with administering, failing to give them due weight under 
New York canons of statutory interpretation. This, too, is misguided. 
This Article will examine DeVera from key legal and policy perspec-
tives. It will provide a brief description of UPK efforts in New York State 
and place them in a broader education policy landscape. That landscape 
includes recent UPK legal and policy developments, and the impact of 
privatization and school choice efforts on education quality and equity 
goals. It will then describe the events leading to Success Academy’s chal-
lenge of UPK quality and oversight standards in DeVera, including the 
background, the case’s development, and the Court of Appeals’ determi-
nation and rationales. This Article will explore the legal bases for the de-
cision, with a focus on the degree to which they depart from key canons 
of statutory interpretation, including the weight that should be accorded 
agency interpretations of complex statutory schemes within their areas of 
expertise. Finally, it will consider DeVera’s law and policy implications 
 
 7 N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 2850-2857 (McKinney 2019). 
 8 See EDUC. § 3602-ee. 
 9 Matter of DeVera v. Elia, 32 N.Y.3d 423, 431 (2018). 
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for efforts to impose standards and oversight on all UPK providers, stand-
ards that are designed to ensure equitable access to quality UPK educa-
tion. This Article ultimately contends that the New York Court of Appeals 
in DeVera should have accepted the New York City and State education 
departments’ interpretation harmonizing the UPK laws and the Charter 
Schools Act to conclude that all UPK providers, including charter 
schools, must meet the standards set forth in the 2014 UPK law. That 
interpretation most closely accords with legislative intent and with 
longstanding principles of statutory interpretation in New York. Thus, 
even without granting deference, the Court of Appeals should have held 
that UPK quality standards apply to all providers, including charter 
schools. Given the language of the UPK law, the manner in which it is 
distinct from the Charter Schools Act, the legislature’s intent with respect 
to UPK, and the City and State education departments’ experience and 
expertise in managing education programs including UPK, deference to 
the agencies’ interpretation that would apply UPK standards to all 
schools, including charters, is most sound based on law and policy. 
I. NEW YORK STATE AND NEW YORK CITY’S UPK PROGRAM 
New York City has received accolades for its implementation of 
UPK as a public policy priority.10 New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio 
identified UPK as a key policy priority in his 2013 mayoral campaign.11 
In 2014, he implemented the first phase of the UPK program, adding 
4,200 pre-kindergarten seats across the City.12 The UPK program steadily 
expanded access to pre-kindergarten, enrolling approximately 70,000 stu-
dents in 2019, up from 19,000 in 2013, with 94% of programs meeting 
quality standards.13 
As observers have noted: 
The significance of New York’s large-scale investment in pre-K 
for all can hardly be overstated. Studies have shown that children 
who have been enrolled in high-quality pre-K programs—in 
classrooms led by skilled and knowledgeable teachers who en-
gage children in imaginative play and block building, and read to 
 
 10 See Stivers, supra note 6. 
 11 HALLEY POTTER, CENTURY FOUND., LESSONS FROM NEW YORK CITY’S UNIVERSAL PRE-
K EXPANSION 1 (2015), https://perma.cc/7XKT-AG6E. 
 12 Press Release, NYC Mayor Bill de Blasio, In First Wave of UPK Implementation, 
Mayor de Blasio Announces More than 4,200 New Full-Day Pre-K Seats Added to Public 
Schools (Apr. 2, 2014), https://perma.cc/RJT8-LY5D. 
 13 Eliza Shapiro, Bright Spot for N.Y.’s Struggling Schools: Pre-K, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 
2019), https://perma.cc/KBC5-SVP5. 
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them and teach them songs—have long-term positive outcomes 
on their future academic and even post-academic lives.14 
 
 High-quality standards and robust oversight have been central to 
New York’s UPK initiative, as was clearly articulated in New York 
State’s 2014 UPK legislation.15 Indeed,  broad access to high-quality early 
education has long been a national education policy goal. Education re-
search strongly establishes the importance of high-quality programming 
to achieve the important cognitive gains that are central to UPK’s pur-
pose.16 This is why New York’s quality standards are crucial to achieving 
the policy goals of improving educational attainment and leveling the 
playing field for all students. 
A. New York’s Universal Pre-Kindergarten Policy Initiatives in a 
Broader Education Policy Landscape 
New York’s UPK initiatives are part of a decades-long effort by the 
federal government (and many state governments) to support early edu-
cation as an anti-poverty strategy, and as a means to address significant 
educational and social inequities.17 Publicly funded early education pro-
grams date back to the Great Society programs of the 1960s and the dawn 
of the federal Head Start program.18 Over time, the anti-poverty rationales 
supporting Head Start and other early education initiatives gave way to 
rationales focused on the country’s economic competitiveness, concerns 
about equitable opportunity, and, most recently, a focus on the cognitive 
benefits of early education.19 
Broader education policy initiatives have also evolved over time. 
The notion of public education as a common good has been challenged as 
part of a broader assault on public institutions, regulation, and the admin-
istrative state that began in the 1980s under the Reagan administration 
and has continued to gain steam, threatening public education and other 
 
 14 Mead, supra note 3. 
 15 See EDUC. § 3602-ee. 
 16 See ALLISON H. FRIEDMAN-KRAUSS ET AL., NAT’L INST. FOR EARLY EDUC. RESEARCH, 
THE STATE OF PRESCHOOL 2018 (2019), https://perma.cc/KCP4-Y3GD. 
 17 See Natalie Gomez-Velez, Universal Pre-Kindergarten: Supporting High Quality and 
Broad Access at a Time of Federal Disengagement and “School Choice,” in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF U.S. EDUCATION LAW (Kristine L. Bowman ed., 2019), https://perma.cc/9Y8L-
3AZY. 
 18 See Maurice R. Dyson, Promise Zones, Poverty, and the Future of Public Schools: 
Confronting the Challenges of Socioeconomic Integration & School Culture in High-Poverty 
Schools, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 711, 715 (2014). 
 19 See ELIZABETH ROSE, THE PROMISE OF PRESCHOOL: FROM HEAD START TO UNIVERSAL 
PRE-KINDERGARTEN 16-17, 101-05, 131-35 (2010). 
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public institutions.20 The 1983 report A Nation at Risk highlighted short-
comings in public education, declaring that “the educational foundations 
of our society are presently being eroded by a rising tide of mediocrity 
that threatens our very future as a Nation and a people.”21 
The report is widely credited with (and criticized for) sparking dec-
ades of education “reform.”22 Much of that reform focused on the estab-
lishment of rigorous standards and accountability measures.23 Despite its 
laudable goals, the report yielded mixed outcomes: it negatively impacted 
the public’s view of public education, eventually drew criticism for hav-
ing “manufactured a crisis,” and was pointed to as an “example of the 
ways political leaders at the time were misleading the nation about the 
quality of public schools.”24 For example, even though A Nation at Risk 
was couched in the language of excellence, equity, and civil rights, it was 
actually used to support misguided privatization and deregulatory efforts 
(including school vouchers, tuition tax credits, and school prayer).25 
Based on a continuing narrative of failing public schools, the 1990s 
saw a ramp-up of test-driven standards and accountability reforms. The 
federal No Child Left Behind Act imposed a testing and accountability 
regime in what some characterized as an “effort to weaponize testing in 
an assault on public schools.”26 Despite well-intentioned statements about 
the goals of No Child Left Behind, which included closing achievement 
gaps, the law contributed to a disparaging narrative about public 
 
 20 See generally, Gillian E. Metzger, Foreword: 1930s Redux: The Administrative State 
Under Siege, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 3 (2017) (“[R]esistance to administrative government re-
flects antigovernment themes that have been a consistent presence in national politics since 
President Reagan’s election in 1980.”). 
 21 NAT’L COMM’N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., A NATION AT RISK: THE IMPERATIVE FOR 
EDUCATIONAL REFORM (1983), https://perma.cc/C4EP-X2TT. 
 22 See Rosemary C. Salomone, The Common School Before and After Brown: Democ-
racy, Equality, and the Productivity Agenda, 120 YALE L.J. 1454, 1477 (2011) (“Beyond the 
Reagan years of federal retreat, and through successive presidential administrations, A Nation 
at Risk continued to inspire a push for national standards and increased federalization of edu-
cation policy.”). 
 23 See Natalie Gomez-Velez, Public School Governance and Democracy: Does Public 
Participation Matter, 53 VILL. L. REV. 297, 306 (2008). 
 24 See Jennifer Park, A Nation at Risk, EDUC. WK. (Sep. 10, 2004), https://perma.cc/
SBK6-YJQC (citing DAVID C. BERLINER & BRUCE J. BIDDLE, THE MANUFACTURED CRISIS: 
MYTHS, FRAUD, AND THE ATTACK ON AMERICA’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1995)). 
 25 See Valerie Strauss, ‘A Nation at Risk’ Demanded Education Reform 35 Years Ago. 
Here’s How It’s Been Bungled Ever Since, WASH. POST (Apr. 26, 2018, 6:00 AM), 
https://perma.cc/66Y5-GLPZ. 
 26 Id.; see also Anya Kamenetz, What ‘A Nation at Risk’ Got Wrong, and Right, About 
U.S. Schools, NPR (Apr. 29, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://perma.cc/T5FH-ZXB8. 
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schools.27 As with earlier attacks on public education, this rhetoric of “re-
form” was used by some to push an educational “choice” agenda favoring 
deregulated charter schools and voucher programs, shifting public dollars 
into the hands of private actors.28 That agenda would gain further traction 
during the early 2000s under both the Bush II and Obama administra-
tions.29 
The Obama administration’s education policy included an emphasis 
on common core standards; and as part of its stimulus package in response 
to the 2008 Great Recession, this policy offered federal “Race to the Top” 
dollars to catalyze state adoption of common core standards and to foster 
federal initiatives like support for early education (including pre-kinder-
garten).30 This helped several states expand pre-kindergarten and other 
early education programs.31 At the same time, continued negative rhetoric 
about public schools catalyzed the expansion of charter schools. Charter 
schools began as an idea grounded in the development of “laboratories of 
innovation”32 that would provide creative  approaches to public educa-
tion.33 The charter school movement has devolved, however, into a move-
ment primarily aimed at deregulating schools funded with public dollars 
and having them “compete” with public schools for funding and for stu-
dents.34 
The combined impact on state education policy-making of the No 
Child Left Behind Act’s punitive accountability measures and the Race 
to the Top program’s significant monetary incentives was met with back-
lash.35 Claims of “federal overreach” generated support for legislation 
 
 27 See generally Cassandra Jones Havard, Funny Money: How Federal Education Fund-
ing Hurts Poor and Minority Students, 19 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 123, 136 (2009) 
(“Criticisms [of No Child Left Behind] have come from every affected constituency—state 
legislators, local and state school administrators, teachers and parents. The criticisms have 
concerned unilateralism, funding, accountability and pedagogy.”). 
 28 See Kevin S. Huffman, Charter Schools, Equal Protection Litigation, and the New 
School Reform Movement, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1290, 1290-91 (1998). 
 29 See Diane Ravitch, The Education Reform Movement Has Failed America. We Need 
Common Sense Solutions That Work., TIME (Feb. 1, 2020), https://perma.cc/8TSB-HYE6. 
 30 Claudio Sanchez & Cory Turner, Obama’s Impact on America’s Schools, NPR (Jan. 
13, 2017, 6:38 AM), https://perma.cc/RYP5-QLYN; Gomez-Velez, supra note 5, at 327. 
 31 See Sanchez & Turner, supra note 30. 
 32 See Greg Richmond, Collaborating, not Competing: Charter Schools as “Laboratories 
of Innovation,” EDUC. POST (Sep. 17, 2014), https://perma.cc/4QJF-DLFE. 
 33 See Richard D. Kahlenberg & Halley Potter, Restoring Shanker’s Vision for Charter 
Schools, AM. EDUCATOR, Winter 2014-2015, at 4, 5-9, https://perma.cc/4V6X-NNZ4. 
 34 See Samuel E. Abrams, Exit, Voice, and Charter Schools, 88 REV. JUR. U. P.R. 894, 
908 (2019) (“Much as Desiderius Erasmus laid the egg Martin Luther hatched, Ray Budde, 
Albert Shanker, and like-minded advocates of reforming public education unwittingly estab-
lished the foundation for a charter movement they would not recognize.”). 
 35 See Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, Restructuring the Elementary and Secondary Educa-
tion Act’s Approach to Equity, 103 MINN. L. REV. 915, 976, 986 (2018). 
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limiting the federal government’s role in education policy-making.36 In 
2015, Congress passed, and President Obama signed, the Every Student 
Succeeds Act (“ESSA”),37 limiting federal involvement and oversight of 
education policy-making.38 This included limiting federal programs en-
couraging early education like pre-kindergarten.39 Pre-kindergarten initi-
atives, therefore, came to depend more heavily on state structuring and 
support. 
Several states have struggled to implement high quality UPK, and 
pre-kindergarten and early education programs and policies vary widely 
across U.S. states and localities. The National Institute for Early Educa-
tion Research (“NIEER”) at Rutgers University publishes an annual re-
port entitled State Preschool Yearbook that details statistics and infor-
mation about preschool enrollment, funding, quality, and access in all 50 
states and the District of Columbia.40 It is an excellent resource regarding 
the status of pre-kindergarten in the United States. According to the 
NIEER 2019 report, 44 states and the District of Columbia offered pre-
school during the 2018-2019 school year, enrolling almost 1.63 million 
children—approximately 1.38 million four-year-olds and 239,000 three-
year-olds.41 The report notes that while preschool enrollment continues to 
climb across the country, both enrollment and overall expenditures have 
slowed and in some cases regressed.42 The report also documents wide 
variations in enrollment levels and per-pupil expenditures among states. 
For example, the District of Columbia provides pre-kindergarten access 
to 87% of four-year-olds and 71% of three-year-olds.43 Florida, Vermont, 
and Oklahoma serve more than 70% of four-year-olds.44 By contrast, 11 
states enroll fewer than 10% of four-year-olds, and six states have no pro-
gram.45 Thus, pre-kindergarten access is far from universal across the 
states. Program quality also varies widely among the states. States like 
 
 36 See Brendan Pelsue, When it Comes to Education, the Federal Government Is in 
Charge of . . . Um, What?, HARV. ED. MAG., Fall 2017, https://perma.cc/G3DK-MVV7. 
 37 Every Student Succeeds Act, Pub. L. No. 114-95, 129 Stat. 1802 (2015). 
 38 Robinson, supra note 35, at 933-38. 
 39 See Gomez-Velez, supra note 17. 
 40 See, e.g., ALLISON H. FRIEDMAN-KRAUSS ET AL., NAT’L INST. FOR EARLY EDUC. 
RESEARCH, THE STATE OF PRESCHOOL 2019: STATE PRESCHOOL YEARBOOK (2019), https://
perma.cc/93ZH-K6B8. 
 41 Id. at 10. The NIEER report includes state- and federally-funded pre-kindergarten, 
Head Start, and special education preschool programs. It also tracks both targeted and univer-
sal pre-kindergarten programs. 
 42 Id. The report notes that from 2018-2019, 12 states decreased enrollment of three- and 
four-year-olds in state-funded preschool programs. 
 43 Id. at 8. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. at 14. 
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Florida that provide broad access often struggle to provide high-quality 
programming.46 
The 2019 NIEER report emphasizes the critical importance of pro-
gram quality: 
A primary goal of state-funded preschool education is to support 
the learning and development of young children as a means of 
improving the quality of their lives now and in the future. Re-
search finds that preschool programs can accomplish this goal, 
but that doing so at scale has proven difficult. Only high-quality 
preschool programs can be expected to produce large and lasting 
gains in outcomes such as achievement, educational attainment, 
personal and social behavior (e.g., reductions in crime), and adult 
health and economic productivity.47 
This means that state and local quality standards and adequate re-
sources are centrally important to the ability of pre-kindergarten programs 
to improve children’s development. 
Like many other states and localities, New York State and New York 
City have experienced a challenging tension between providing broad ac-
cess to pre-kindergarten while ensuring consistently high-quality pro-
grams.48 To accomplish these important dual goals, the City and State 
have, like many states and localities, engaged with a range of early child-
hood education providers including charter schools. 
1. Interplay of UPK with Charter Schools and Recent Educational 
Policy Initiatives 
The ascendance of the charter school movement across the country 
has created both opportunities and significant challenges with respect to 
achieving UPK goals of broad access and high-quality programming. 
While it is difficult to provide publicly funded pre-K programs that ensure 
high quality, equity, and universal access regardless of the provider, doing 
so in a deregulated, “school choice” environment has only amplified the 
challenge. Tensions among goals of equity, access, and quality have be-
come sharper with the growth of various school choice and privatization 
initiatives, which tend to eschew public oversight and can exacerbate in-
equity. The picture is complicated and hotly contested.49 While some 
 
 46 See id. at 73-74. 
 47 Id. at 18. 
 48 See Gomez-Velez, supra note 5, at 327-336. 
 49 See Mandy McLaren, New Charter Schools Debate: Are They Widening Racial Divides 
in Public Education?, WASH. POST (May 16, 2017), https://perma.cc/E2C8-VWWW; Claudio 
Sanchez, The Charter School vs. Public School Debate Continues, NPR (July 16, 2013, 5:02 
PM), https://perma.cc/8WNF-RUS7; Rachel Slade, The Great Charter Schools Debate, BOS. 
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view “school choice” efforts as primarily allied with privatization and de-
regulation—and in conflict with the notion of public schools as serving 
the common good50—others view “choice” and public/private partner-
ships as offering opportunities for innovation, expansion, and quality im-
provement.51 In the context of UPK expansion, tensions between these 
views tend to be heightened, as states and localities seeking to expand 
UPK access often must rely on a range of providers (including charter 
schools) to meet program needs.52 
The standards used to measure quality, as well as the quality of edu-
cation offered by charter schools, vary across the country. Some offer 
high-quality programs, as judged by test scores and disciplinary 
measures.53 At the same time, “choice” models, including charter schools, 
tend to “exacerbate the segregation of students by race/ethnicity and the 
stratification of students by socioeconomic status.”54 Indeed, some schol-
ars studying charter schools locally have found that “charters can cur-
rently choose their students, rather than families choosing their schools—
in essence, school choice has evolved to mean that charter schools, and 
not families, choose.”55 In addition, several studies have found that, when 
controlling for factors such as student need and school size, traditional 
public schools outperform charter schools.56 Nonetheless, in the K-12 
context, many charter supporters argue that charter schools perform at 
 
NEWS (Aug. 28, 2016, 5:45 AM), https://perma.cc/FJT2-3QWJ; Valerie Strauss, A Dozen 
Problems with Charter Schools, WASH. POST (May 20, 2014, 2:30 PM) https://perma.cc/
H3ZP-RLVV. 
 50 See, e.g., Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392, 412-13 (Fla. 2006) (holding that a voucher 
program violated the Florida Constitution’s requirement that education be provided through a 
“uniform” system of public schools, and noting that the Florida Constitution “does not allow 
the use of state monies to fund a private school education”); Ian Farrell & Chelsea Marx, The 
Fallacy of Choice: The Destructive Effect of School Vouchers on Children with Disabilities, 
67 AM. U. L. REV. 1797 (2018) (arguing that school voucher programs may violate the Equal 
Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution by requiring students with disabilities to waive the 
federal rights and protections they would be entitled to receive in the public school system). 
 51 See, e.g., Martha Minow, Confronting the Seduction of Choice: Law, Education, and 
American Pluralism, 120 YALE L.J. 814, 843-848 (2011). 
 52 See POTTER, CENTURY FOUND., supra note 11, at 7-8. 
 53 See, e.g., Anya Kamenetz, High Test Scores at a Nationally Lauded Charter, but at 
What Cost?, NPR (June 24, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://perma.cc/54RW-N7AG. 
 54 DAVID R. GARCIA, SCHOOL CHOICE 160 (2018). 
 55 Julian Vasquez Heilig et al., Separate and Unequal? The Problematic Segregation of 
Special Populations in Charter Schools Relative to Traditional Public Schools, 27 STAN. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 251, 285 (2016). 
 56 Myron Orfield & Thomas Luce, Charters, Choice, and the Constitution, 2014 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 377, 398 (2014) (“The Institute on Metropolitan Opportunity (IMO) authored 2008, 
2012, and 2013 reports providing clear evidence that traditional public schools outperformed 
charter schools after controlling for student poverty, race, special education needs, limited 
language abilities, student mobility rates, and school size.”). 
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least as well as—and in some cases better than—traditional public 
schools, particularly with respect to test scores.57 Success Academy is 
among the charter providers touted as high-performing based on state test 
scores.58 Yet the overall picture is “modest at best and inconsistent across 
subjects and years.”59 Several studies of K-12 charter school performance 
yield quite a mixed record, including several troubling failures.60 Over-
sight mechanisms have been shown to be just as important for charter 
school performance as they are for other key governmental functions.61 
Overall, the performance of the K-12 charter sector varies almost as 
widely as the public school sector.62 
Moreover, pre-kindergarten is different. Education scholar Diane 
Ravitch notes: 
Children need prekindergarten classes that teach them how to so-
cialize with others, how to listen and learn, how to communicate 
well, and how to care for themselves, while engaging in the joyful 
pursuit of play and learning that is appropriate to their age and 
 
 57 See, e.g., Grace Chen, Charter Schools vs. Traditional Public Schools: Which One Is 
Under-Performing?, PUB. SCH. REV. (Nov. 12, 2018), https://perma.cc/GRS3-RRZ6. 
 58 See, e.g., ROBERT PONDISCIO, HOW THE OTHER HALF LEARNS: EQUALITY, EXCELLENCE, 
AND THE BATTLE OVER SCHOOL CHOICE 16 (2020) (“At Success, 82 percent of black and His-
panic students passed [the New York State English Language Arts exam] in 2016—a rate that 
easily outpaces even the 59 percent rate for Asian and White students citywide. In math, 93 
percent of Success Academy’s black students and 95 percent of its Hispanic students passed 
their math tests, with 73 percent scoring at Level 4, the very highest level.”). 
 59 GARCIA, supra note 54, at 161. 
 60 See generally Preston C. Green III et al., Are We Heading Toward a Charter School 
Bubble?: Lessons from the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 783, 793-794 
(2016). 
 61 See Susan L. DeJarnatt, Oversight, Charter Schools, and a Thorough and Efficient Sys-
tem of Public Education, 70 S.C. L. REV. 435, 477 (2018) (“Government functions need over-
sight even when the government contracts them out to private entities. No one argues that it is 
‘overreach’ to have oversight of a contract to build a bridge or road. Police and fire depart-
ments comply with regulations and are subject to review. Public education should be no dif-
ferent. Just as roads are not merely for the benefit of the people who use them today, schools 
benefit entire communities and future members of those communities. Stewardship of our 
collective resources is critical.”). 
 62 Robert A. Garda, Jr., The Mississippi Charter School Act: Will it Produce Effective and 
Equitable Charter Schools?, 36 MISS. C. L. REV. 265, 268 (2018) (“In 2009, [the Stanford 
University Center for Research on Education Outcomes] conducted a comprehensive study 
regarding educational outcomes of students in charter schools and concluded that ‘in the ag-
gregate charter schools are not advancing the learning gains of their students as much as tra-
ditional schools.’ It also found a wide variation in performance between states. The study 
concluded that ‘state laws governing charter school operation have an important impact on 
student academic growth,’ but could only identify correlations rather than causative effects.”) 
(quoting CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON EDUC. OUTCOMES, MULTIPLE CHOICE: CHARTER SCHOOL 
PERFORMANCE IN 16 STATES 9, 45 (2009)). 
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development and that builds their background knowledge and vo-
cabulary.63 
The pedagogical approaches deemed appropriate for pre-K appear at 
odds with the approaches that many charter schools tout as the basis for 
their success. These include regimented study focused on test preparation, 
top-down models of instruction, and requiring student (and parent) adher-
ence to strict codes of conduct and discipline.64 Like the broader charter 
school debate, the wisdom of using deregulatory charter schools for UPK 
is contested. Because UPK engages a broad mix of public and private 
providers (including non-profit and community-based organizations, day 
care centers, and private schools), questions of quality, oversight, and 
competition are sharpened.65 
Indeed, some charter school supporters lament: “Charters must com-
pete with long-standing community-based and district providers for 
scarce pre-K resources. Inadequate funding for public pre-K programs 
makes it challenging for charters to offer high-quality pre-K program-
ming. Public programs must also adhere to “quality” standards that im-
pose cumbersome input or process requirements that infringe on charter 
autonomy.”66As a broader policy matter, significant concerns have arisen 
with respect to “school choice” and competition operating as mechanisms 
that extract public funds, disinvest from common public schools, and ex-
acerbate race and class inequity.67 More fundamentally, many choice and 
privatization models frame education as a private commodity rather than 
a public good.68 This does great damage to a vision of public education as 
 
 63 DIANE RAVITCH, REIGN OF ERROR: THE HOAX OF THE PRIVATIZATION MOVEMENT AND 
THE DANGER TO AMERICA’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 7 (2013). 
 64 See, e.g., Sarah Carr, How Strict Is Too Strict? The Backlash Against No-Excuses Dis-
cipline in High School, ATLANTIC, Dec. 2014, https://perma.cc/63W5-76ZD. 
 65 See, e.g., Eliza Shapiro, 13 Charter Schools Approved to Offer Pre-K This Fall, 
POLITICO (Mar. 17, 2015, 5:41 AM), https://perma.cc/P7UT-SEDW; Linda Jacobson, New 
Twist in Charter Schools: Preschool Programs, EDUCATION WEEK (Mar. 20, 2002), https://
perma.cc/ZN79-NX45. 
 66 Ashley LiBetti & Sara Mead, The Charter Model Goes to Preschool, Winter 2017, 
EDUCATION NEXT at 36, 38. 
 67 See Osamudia R. James, Opt-Out Education: School Choice as Racial Subordination, 
99 IOWA L. REV. 1083, 1086 (2014) (“Choice rhetoric problematically idealizes competition, 
privacy, independence, and individualism, while overshadowing interdependence and vulner-
ability in public education, and outsources conversations that belong in the public sphere to 
families and individuals. Yet choice rhetoric has endured, due to its sanitizing effect on ine-
quality and vulnerability.”); Erika K. Wilson, The New White Flight, 14 DUKE J. CONST. L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 233, 238 (2019) (“[I]n some parts of the country that are embracing school choice, 
white charter school enclaves are forming.”). 
 68 See Derek W. Black, Charter Schools, Vouchers, and the Public Good, 48 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 445, 447 (2013) (“[T]he purpose of receiving an education, at least a public 
education, goes far beyond the teaching of information and skills and the interests of individual 
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essential to human development, prosperity, and robust engagement in 
democracy and society.69 Promoters of this vision of public education as 
a crucially important common good are particularly suspicious of the ex-
pansion of charter schools and other “choice” models into early educa-
tion.70 
2. Success Academy’s Background and Its Place in the New York 
Charter School Movement 
The Success Academy Charter Schools network’s challenge to New 
York’s UPK implementation provides an example of the dissonance be-
tween some charter schools’ stated support for educational quality and 
equity, and their fierce opposition to the public oversight needed to ensure 
those values. Of several charter schools that applied for New York City 
UPK grants, Success Academy was the only provider that refused to agree 
to the quality-focused contractual requirements that were announced as a 
condition of a UPK grant.71 One would assume that a charter network that 
claims to support quality education would agree with the need for UPK 
quality standards and would have little problem ensuring those standards 
are met; however, that is not the position that Success Academy has taken. 
Experiences in California and beyond have demonstrated that meaningful 
oversight is important to charter school effectiveness and to protecting the 
public interest.72 
 
students. Public education includes the transmission of social values that lead to social cohe-
sion and the overall betterment of society.”) (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 
(1954)). 
 69 See Michael J. Haslip & Dominic F. Gullo, The Changing Landscape of Early Child-
hood Education: Implications for Policy and Practice, 46 EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUC. J. 249, 
253 (2018) (“A moral vision is needed to guide education to focus on both individual and 
community well-being and preparation for citizenship in a democracy that upholds social jus-
tice and protects the common good. Loss of the moral vision that has long supported the values 
of citizenship and democracy as a primary purpose of education appears to be an ongoing 
trend influencing curriculum and instruction across the educational spectrum.”). 
 70 See, e.g., RAVITCH, supra note 63, at 34-35 (describing how corporate education re-
formers “view students as ‘human capital’ or ‘assets.’ One seldom sees any reference in their 
literature or public declarations to the importance of developing full persons to assume the 
responsibilities of citizenship.”). 
 71 Appeal of De Vera, 55 Ed. Dep’t. Rep., Decision No. 16,882. 
 72 See, e.g., Anna M. Phillips & Howard Blume, Inglewood Charter School with History 
of Alleged Wrongdoing Denied Renewal by County, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/2BEQ-6TXJ (“In California and across much of the country, a growing back-
lash against charters has pushed left-leaning state legislatures to place stricter regulations on 
how the schools are opened and overseen.”); Greg Richmond, Op-Ed: If California Wants 
Better Compliance from Charter Schools, It Must Fix Its Oversight System, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 
18, 2016, 5:00 AM), https://perma.cc/QNX2-2NSA (noting that although “a majority of Cal-
ifornia’s charter schools meet their obligation to all the children in their communities, too 
often, no one is paying attention when an individual charter school does something wrong”). 
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But Success Academy’s litigious approach is less surprising when 
considered within the broader context of public education privatization 
and deregulation.73 Charter schools hold a contentious place in New York 
City and State education policy and politics. Some of that contention 
stems from opposing views of the purposes and appropriate methods of 
public education, and from concerns about the impact of charter schools 
and other “school choice” efforts on quality and equity goals.74 Indeed, 
proponents and opponents of charter schools are not easy to categorize. 
Some contention, however, including concerns about Success Academy 
Charter Schools, is based on troubling experiences such as charter 
schools’ exclusion of certain targeted students,75 inappropriate student 
discipline,76 and the punishment of parents77 as means of eliminating “dif-
ficult” students and families to help bolster school outcomes. 
The goals of the charter school sector, while ostensibly (and in some 
cases actually) aimed at improving education quality, have been revealed 
to be more squarely focused on a broader project of privatization and de-
regulation.78 This is one reason why the Success Academy challenge and 
the Court of Appeals’ decision are particularly troubling. Success Acad-
emy’s determination to flout New York’s UPK standards, contracts, and 
 
 73 See NOLIWE ROOKS, CUTTING SCHOOL: THE SEGRENOMICS OF AMERICAN EDUCATION 
30-31, 178-79 (2020) (noting that education privatization and deregulation are part of a long-
term strategy that includes charter operators’ profit motive). 
 74 See sources cited supra note 50. 
 75 See, e.g., Kate Taylor, At a Success Academy Charter School, Singling Out Pupils Who 
Have ‘Got to Go,’ N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2015), https://perma.cc/G726-TXEG (describing a 
“Got to Go” list of students that the principal thought should be removed from the school). 
 76 See, e.g., Johanna F. Roberts, No Excuses for Charter Schools: How Disproportionate 
Discipline of Students with Disabilities Violates Federal Law, 70 OKLA. L. REV. 729, 738 
(2018) (“Despite the stated purpose of [No-Excuses discipline] policies, there is no evidence 
to suggest that zero-tolerance discipline practices have increased the consistency of school 
discipline. Likewise, findings suggest that zero-tolerance schools have higher rates of suspen-
sion and expulsion, and have been found to ‘have less satisfactory ratings of school climate, 
to have less satisfactory school governance structures, and to spend a disproportionate amount 
of time on disciplinary matters.’”); see also S.G. v. Success Acad. Charter Sch., Inc., No. 18 
Civ. 2484 (KPF), 2019 WL 1284280, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (“Plaintiffs argue, and the Court 
agrees, that the [complaint] sufficiently alleges ‘ADA and Rehabilitation Act liability based 
on both bad faith and gross misjudgment and under both the disparate impact and failure to 
reasonably accommodate theories of liability.’”). 
 77 Andrew Gerst, Limited Access Letters: How New York City Schools Illegally Ban “Un-
ruly” Parents of Color and Parents of Students with Disabilities, 22 CUNY L. REV. 334, 335-
336 (2019) (“The word ‘damn’ caused problems. A few hours later, Success Academy’s prin-
cipal, Brittany Davis-Roberti, banned Battle from the school grounds. The ban came in the 
form of a letter from Principal Davis-Roberti. In order to ever set foot on the campus again, 
the principal required Battle to ‘schedule an appointment . . . to apologize for [her] behavior.’ 
Principal Davis-Roberti also required Battle to ‘pledge that it [would] never happen again.’”). 
 78 See generally ROOKS, supra note 73; RAYNARD SANDERS ET AL., TWENTY-FIRST-
CENTURY JIM CROW SCHOOLS: THE IMPACT OF CHARTERS ON PUBLIC EDUCATION (2018). 
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oversight requirements, regardless of the impact on the broader UPK pro-
ject, make clear that Success Academy’s primary objective is deregula-
tion.79  
Success Academy describes itself as “a not-for-profit education cor-
poration that is the governing legal entity for 24 high-performing public 
charter elementary schools, nine public charter middle schools, and one 
public charter high school, for a total of 34 schools across New York City, 
in Brooklyn, the Bronx, Queens, Harlem, and other parts of Manhattan.”80 
The Success Academy Charter Schools Network is a well-funded and po-
litically powerful network of charter schools. Established as Harlem Suc-
cess Academy in 2006 by Eva Moskowitz, a former member of the New 
York City Council,81 Success Academy’s stated mission is to “[b]uild ex-
ceptional, world-class public schools that prove children from all back-
grounds can succeed in college and life; and advocate across the country 
to change public policies that prevent so many children from having ac-
cess to opportunity.”82 This is an admirable goal, and many observers tout 
Success Academy’s strong showing with respect to test scores and grad-
uation rates as evidence that it is a better option than most public schools 
(and most charter schools) in New York City.83 
When considering those metrics, however, it is important to note that 
Success Academy benefits from supports that are not available to most 
other schools.84 Success Academy is politically powerful and has connec-
tions to enormous wealth.85 Its wealth and political access have rendered 
 
 79 See Diane Ravitch, The New York Times Is Spreading Charter School Lies, JACOBIN 
(Nov. 30, 2019), https://perma.cc/8ZFK-TM56 (“Why has the charter movement lost its lus-
ter? . . .[M]aybe it was the almost daily revelations of waste, fraud, and abuse that occurs when 
public money is handed to entrepreneurs without any accountability or oversight.”); Jack 
Schneider, School’s Out: Charters Were Supposed to Save Public Education. Why Are Amer-
icans Turning Against Them? WASH. POST. (May 30, 2019), https://perma.cc/MRV5-MW6W. 
But see Karen DeWitt, NY Charter School Expansion Unlikely in 2019, WAMC (May 4, 
2019), https://perma.cc/Q522-6BK4; Erica L. Green & Eliza Shapiro, Minority Voters Chafe 
as Democratic Candidates Abandon Charter Schools, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2019), https://
perma.cc/E3EM-QDZ4. 
 80 Verified Article 78 Petition at ¶ 17, In re Vera v. Elia, No. 1014-16, 2016 WL 4580093 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 8, 2016). 
 81 See Kate Taylor, At Success Academy Charter Schools, High Scores and Polarizing 
Tactics, N.Y TIMES (Apr. 6, 2015), https://perma.cc/BXX5-3R3K. 
 82 About, SUCCESS ACADEMY NYC, https://perma.cc/HV4S-6CC2 (last visited May 9, 
2020). 
 83 See, e.g., Ian Livingston, Examining the Success of Success Academy Charter Schools, 
BROOKINGS (Sept. 10, 2015), https://perma.cc/9G3V-TTWN. 
 84 See, e.g., Kate Taylor, Success Academy Charter School Network Receives $25 Million 
Gift, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2016), https://perma.cc/9TLX-U2V5. 
 85 For example, as noted by Valerie Strauss in the context of Success Academy’s recent 
effort to impose its own teacher certification requirements: “The corporation with the largest 
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Success Academy a powerful force in establishing and expanding its char-
ter network,86 demanding access to public funds and public space,87 and 
operating with minimal oversight.88 Success Academy also benefits from 
private funding in addition to the public dollars it receives from New York 
City and State.89 Success Academy’s CEO Eva Moskowitz has taken full 
advantage of her access to wealth and political connections to advocate 
for increased public support for charter-friendly policies and laws.90 She 
also organizes charter school parents and students to lobby as part of her 
political efforts.91 
Moskowitz has pushed hard against government efforts at regulatory 
oversight, be it in the area of labor, fiscal control, curriculum, or student 
retention. Success Academy has developed a reputation for limiting ac-
cess to its schools to only the most motivated and compliant parents and 
 
number of charter schools under the control of the SUNY Charter School Institute is the Suc-
cess Academy charter chain, run by Eva Moskowitz. Her political action committee, the Great 
Public Schools PAC, contributed $65,000 to Cuomo in 2011-2012 and another $50,000 to date 
in 2017. Success Academy Chairman Daniel Loeb, founder and chief executive of Third Rock 
Capital, and his wife, have directly contributed over $133,000 to Cuomo. Since 2015, Loeb 
has added $300,000 to Moskowitz’s PAC, and another $270,000 to other PACs that support 
Cuomo. That’s more than $700,000.” Valerie Strauss, What’s the Link Between Charter 
Schools, Political Donations and Teacher Certification in New York?, WASH. POST (Aug. 2, 
2017, 4:47 PM), https://perma.cc/W9ZT-JCKW. 
 86 See, e.g., Judith Messina, Crain’s 2019 Most Powerful Women in New York, CRAIN’S 
N.Y. BUS. (June 17, 2019), https://perma.cc/SXT3-25QC (“Eva Moskowitz, 55, may have her 
differences with Mayor Bill de Blasio, but Washington, it seems, has her back. In April the 
U.S. Department of Education handed her nearly $10 million to open six charter schools and 
expand four middle schools and six pre-K programs—which would bring the total number of 
Success Academy schools to 52.”). 
 87 See, e.g., Michael Elsen-Rooney, Shuttered Catholic School Could Be the Site of New 
Success Academy Middle School in Queens, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Nov. 13, 2019, 1:35 PM), 
https://perma.cc/G6X4-Q5KC. 
 88 See, e.g., Alan Singer, How Charter Schools Buy Political Support, HUFFPOST (Aug. 
10, 2017, 6:25 AM), https://perma.cc/MN6F-VU4U (discussing how individuals associated 
with Success Academy donated close to $2 million to Governor Andrew Cuomo, who then 
supported a move to exempt charter schools from standard public-school teacher certification 
requirements). 
 89 See, e.g., Ben Chapman, Success Academy Charter Schools’ Revenue Doubles in a 
Year; CEO Eva Moskowitz’s Pay Jumps to $567K, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 19, 2014, 2:30 
AM), https://perma.cc/R4XR-2SGX. 
 90 See, e.g., Andrew Ujifusa, Michael Bloomberg Brings Controversial N.Y.C. Schools 
Record to 2020 Race, EDUC. WEEK (Nov. 24, 2019, 10:49 AM) (noting that under Mayor 
Bloomberg, the number of charter schools in New York City grew from 22 in 2003 to 159 in 
the 2012-13 school year, and that Bloomberg was an “ally” of Eva Moskowitz), https://
perma.cc/WRG2-PUN8. 
 91 See, e.g., Bernadette Hogan & Carl Campanile, Charter School Parents Worried that 
Gov. Cuomo Is Abandoning Them, N.Y. POST (Jan. 15, 2020, 2:42 PM), https://perma.cc/
3SZQ-2E8B. 
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students, while avoiding accountability for its actions.92 This penchant for 
fending off all efforts at public oversight (including oversight of Success 
Academy’s voluntary participation in New York City’s UPK program) 
runs contrary to quality education goals, while permitting charter schools 
like Success Academy to claim “better” outcomes than schools subject to 
greater oversight and accountability.93 
B. New York’s Universal Pre-Kindergarten Law and Its 
Implementation 
1. New York Pre-Kindergarten Background 
New York State has a long record of support for early education, 
establishing targeted pre-kindergarten programs starting in the 1960s.94 
Building on that history, New York State passed legislation supporting 
UPK in 1997 and again in 2014.95 The 2014 UPK law contains specific 
provisions designed to ensure high-quality programming. These include 
provisions addressing curriculum; learning environment; materials; fam-
ily engagement; staffing; teacher education and experience; facilities; 
physical well-being, health, and nutrition; and partnerships with non-
profit, community, and educational institutions.96 The 2014 Law exem-
plifies the legislature’s strong commitment to ensuring high quality in its 
pre-kindergarten programs. The legislation’s emphasis on high-quality 
programs and broad access cannot be overstated. 
Notwithstanding its longstanding commitments to both targeted and 
universal pre-kindergarten, New York State has taken a variety of ap-
proaches, used multiple funding sources, and has had mixed success in 
 
 92 See, e.g., Susan Edelman, New Book Tells Secrets and Surprises of Success Academy’s 
Winning Academics, N.Y. POST (Sept. 7, 2019), https://perma.cc/G479-D9XX (asserting that 
Success Academy “gets rid of kids it finds too difficult”). 
 93 See, e.g., Chester E. Finn, Jr., Success Story: Founder and CEO of Success Academy 
Recounts Her Journey, EDUCATION NEXT, Spring 2018, at 75, 75-76 (reviewing EVA 
MOSKOWITZ, THE EDUCATION OF EVA MOSKOWITZ: A MEMOIR (2017)) (“[I]t helped a lot that 
Mayor Michael Bloomberg and schools chief Joel Klein were in charge of the school system 
during most of the time Moskowitz was struggling to get traction, and that Success Academy 
benefited from umpteen favorable rulings from the city’s education department. In most 
places, charter folks must contend with superintendents and locally elected school boards that 
are far more beholden to the teachers’ union and other adult interests than were Messrs. 
Bloomberg and Klein.”). 
 94 James D. Folts, History of the University of the State of New York and the State Edu-
cation Department 1784 – 1996, N.Y. ST. LIBR., https://perma.cc/PU6J-S7CD (last updated 
Oct. 22, 2018). 
 95 CTR. FOR CHILDREN’S INITIATIVES & CTR. FOR EDUC. EQUITY, ESTABLISHING 
UNIVERSAL ACCESS TO PREKINDERGARTEN AS A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 8 (2017), https://
perma.cc/YK5W-XYZQ. 
 96 See EDUC. § 3602-ee. 
2020] WHY MATTER OF DEVERA MATTERS 255 
implementing pre-kindergarten programs that are broadly accessible, eq-
uitable, and of high quality. For example: 
NYS has several separate pre-K funding streams, five of which 
are competitive awards. UPK is administered by school districts 
via an allocation grant award that is non-competitive. However, 
the funds and awardees for this program have been frozen for 
nearly a decade. For the last four years, school districts have been 
able to compete for additional funding for five-year grant awards. 
In 2016-2017, state pre-K spending served 122,871 children, 
51.6% of the state’s 4-year-olds and 1.5% of 3-year-olds. New 
York was also awarded a federal Preschool Development Grant 
(PDG). In 2016-2017, $25 million was used to support the enroll-
ment of 2,350 low-income 4-year-olds in five school districts in 
both new slots and in enhancing existing slots.97 
New York Governor Andrew Cuomo has supported efforts to estab-
lish high-quality and broadly accessible UPK. For example, in late 2018 
he announced a $15 million award to establish pre-kindergarten programs 
for the first time in several high-need school districts in New York State.98 
Governor Cuomo also claims to have “more than doubled the state’s com-
mitment to early childhood education.”99 He created the state’s first full-
day pre-kindergarten seats in 2013, and in 2015 expanded pre-kindergar-
ten to serve three-year-olds.100 
But New York State’s most significant strides in providing broad 
pre-kindergarten access are in New York City, where Mayor Bill de 
Blasio made UPK a top priority starting with the 2015-2016 school year. 
Building on the 2014 UPK law’s specific quality standards and grant re-
quirements, the Mayor and Schools Chancellor sought to expand capacity 
for high-quality UPK by tapping into New York City’s existing early ed-
ucation infrastructure and contracting with a combination of public 
schools, city and state agencies, community-based organizations, non-
profits, and private providers.101 As noted more fully below, New York 
City’s UPK program is largely supported by a New York State Education 
 
 97 NAT’L INST. FOR EARLY EDUC. RESEARCH, IMPLEMENTING 15 ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS FOR 
HIGH-QUALITY PRE-K: NEW YORK, https://perma.cc/8HFX-XV52 (last visited May 18, 2020). 
 98 Press Release, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo, Governor Cuomo Announces $15 Mil-
lion to Support Pre-Kindergarten Programs Statewide (Dec. 5, 2018), https://perma.cc/A2VP-
YKU9. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. 
 101 See OFFICE OF THE MAYOR, READY TO LAUNCH: NEW YORK CITY’S IMPLEMENTATION 
PLAN FOR FREE, HIGH-QUALITY, FULL-DAY UNIVERSAL PRE-KINDERGARTEN 3, 11 (2014), 
https://perma.cc/NQW8-3WRH. 
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Department (“SED”) grant under the 2014 UPK law, in addition to con-
tributions from New York City’s own education funds.102 New York City 
then issues grants to UPK providers through a process that is focused on 
ensuring that the high-quality standards set forth in the legislation and 
required by the SED are carried through.103 
New York City is currently at the forefront in implementing univer-
sal UPK programs. Since its announcement in 2014 and launch in 2015, 
New York City’s UPK program has expanded from enrolling 19,163 four-
year-olds in pre-kindergarten in FY 2014, to 53,120 in FY 2015, 68,547 
in FY 2016,104 and up to 71,481 full-day and 2,101 half-day students by 
FY 2018.105 Importantly, in addition to increased access through broad 
enrollment, New York City’s UPK program has placed a central focus on 
ensuring high-quality programs.106 
In April 2017, Mayor de Blasio announced an expansion of universal 
pre-kindergarten to include three-year-olds, dubbing the program “3K for 
All.”107 The announcement touted the success of New York City’s “his-
toric effort to make high quality, early childhood education available to 
every four-year-old in New York City,” claiming that it “is one of the 
most successful expansions of any municipal pre-kindergarten program 
in the country” and that “we are already witnessing it’s [sic] tremendous 
impacts.”108 New York State and New York City’s recent UPK efforts 
have thus focused on ensuring high-quality programming as well as broad 
and equitable access. The central importance of UPK quality standards 
makes Success Academy’s rejection of UPK oversight and the Court of 
Appeals decision in DeVera all the more troubling. 
2.  Implementing New York City’s UPK 
New York City’s implementation of UPK is based on a state appro-
priation of funds pursuant to New York State’s 2014 UPK law, which 
 
 102 For the 2015-2016 term, roughly 78% of funding for NYC DOE’s program came from 
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 103 See OFFICE OF THE MAYOR, supra note 101, at 7, 11. 
 104 Press Release, NYC Mayor Bill de Blasio, Mayor de Blasio Announces over 68,500 
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data.nysed.gov/enrollment.php?year=2019&instid=7889678368. 
 106 See NYC Mayor Bill de Blasio, supra note 104 (“If New York City continues to focus 
on improving its program quality and using data to inform its planning, it is on track to a very 
strong universal pre-K program that truly makes an impact on inequality and improves the 
lives of millions of young people.”). 
 107 Press Release, NYC Mayor Bill de Blasio, Mayor de Blasio Announces 3-K for All 
(Apr. 24, 2017), https://perma.cc/L4H9-2YNA. 
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amended the earlier 1997 UPK law to provide full-day pre-kindergarten 
and included specific quality standards for all providers operating through 
a grant process.109 In May 2014, the SED released an Announcement of 
Funding Opportunity for Statewide Universal Full-Day Pre-K 
(“SUFDPK”) programs.110 The announcement included a Request for 
Proposals (“RFP”) setting forth the requirements for school district UPK 
proposals.111 The SED’s RFP required that proposals demonstrate inno-
vation and high quality.112 Applicants  also were asked to address student 
and community need.  
The SED RFP indicated that the SUFDPK program would “ensure 
high-quality early care and education by requiring all grantees to demon-
strate quality program standards.”113 It set forth the program requirements 
that school districts and eligible providers, including charter schools, 
were required to meet or assure to be eligible for the grant.114 It required 
that, except as otherwise provided, all programs comply with the same 
rules and requirements as UPK programs funded pursuant to Education 
Law § 3602-e, including Commissioner’s regulations § 151-1, and incor-
porate these requirements in their program design.115 The RFP required 
that programs operate under the jurisdiction of the local board of educa-
tion, which would be responsible for the proper disbursement of and ac-
counting for project funds.116 The RFP also required applicants to certify 
that the program would be conducted in accordance with all applicable 
federal and state laws and regulations, and applicants were required to 
sign a Statement of Assurances.117 
In response to the RFP, the New York City Department of Education 
(“DOE”) submitted a consolidated application.118 The DOE requested 
$300 million to provide over 50,000 high-quality full-day seats in the 
2014-2015 school year, and an additional 20,000 seats in the 2015-2016 
school year, bringing the total seats to over 70,000.119 The DOE stated 
that the expansion would ensure that every four-year-old in New York 
City has access to a pre-K seat, and would enable the DOE to build a 
 
 109 See CTR. FOR CHILDREN’S INITIATIVES & CTR. FOR EDUC. EQUITY, supra note 95, at 3. 
 110 Matter of DeVera v. Elia, 152 A.D.3d 13, 15-16 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017). 
 111 Id. at 16. 
 112 Appeal of De Vera, 55 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 16,882. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Matter of DeVera v. Elia, 32 N.Y.3d 423, 447 (2018) (Rivera, J., dissenting). 
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single system of high-quality, full-day pre-kindergarten for the city’s fam-
ilies.120 The SED approved the DOE’s request in the amount of $295 mil-
lion.121 
In December 2014, the DOE released an RFP directed to charter 
schools interested in providing UPK programs for the 2015-2016 school 
year.122 Pursuant to the 2014 UPK law, compliance with statutory and 
regulatory standards, program quality standards, and oversight and super-
vision by the New York City school district were RFP grant require-
ments.123 The RFP noted that charter schools included in a school dis-
trict’s state grant application were prohibited from applying separately for 
additional funds because the pre-kindergarten funds were being provided 
to the school district, not to the charter schools; it also stated that charter 
schools were prohibited from commingling pre-kindergarten funds with 
their other funds.124 The DOE’s RFP sought to identify eligible high-qual-
ity early childhood providers to collaborate with the DOE’s Division of 
Early Childhood Education (“DECE”).125 The RFP “was open to charter 
schools serving any of DOE’S 32 community school districts that could 
provide a consistent weekly schedule for a full-day program between 8:00 
am and 4:30 pm, 5 days per week for 180 days of the school year.”126 The 
RFP described the basis for contract awards and payment structure, at-
tached a sample contract, and stated that contract awards were subject to 
timely completion of contract negotiations between DOE and the “se-
lected proposer.”127 The sample contract included the following language: 
“NO PAYMENTS WILL BE MADE BY THE DOE UNTIL THE 
CONTRACT IS REGISTERED WITH THE NYC COMPTROLLER’S 
OFFICE.”128 This is standard procurement procedure in New York 
City.129 
In response to the RFP, Success Academy NYC submitted UPK ap-
plications on behalf of three of its charter schools: Harlem I, Cobble Hill, 
 
 120 Id. at 446-47. 
 121 Id. at 432 n.4. 
 122 See Appeal of De Vera, 55 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 16,882. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Matter of DeVera, 32 N.Y.3d at 446 (Rivera, J., dissenting). 
 125 See Appeal of De Vera, 55 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 16,882. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. 
 129 See N.Y.C. Comptroller, Contract Registration, https://comptroller.nyc.gov/ser-
vices/for-city-agencies/contract-registration/ (“To ensure that the City has adequate funding 
to cover the cost of its contracts and to prevent corruption in City procurement, the City Char-
ter requires that contracts and agreements entered into by City agencies be registered by the 
Comptroller prior to implementation.”). 
2020] WHY MATTER OF DEVERA MATTERS 259 
and Williamsburg.130 In March 2015, the DOE advised Success Academy 
NYC that it found the proposed programs to be “conditionally eligible for 
award,” “subject to timely completion of contract negotiation and timely 
submission of contract documents.”131 In April 2015, three Success Acad-
emy schools held admission lotteries to fill pre-kindergarten seats.132 On 
either July 23 or August 4, 2015, the DOE sent proposed UPK contracts 
to the three conditionally eligible Success Academy schools.133 Although 
the proposed contracts included a provision stating that issues regarding 
the lawfulness of any contract terms could be brought to the DOE Chan-
cellor’s designee for resolution, Success Academy did not make any in-
quiries about the contract, nor did it execute the contracts.134 Success 
Academy began pre-kindergarten programs at the three schools on Au-
gust 24, 2015.135 On August 27, 2015, the DOE sent an email congratu-
lating Success Academy on starting its pre-kindergarten classes but also 
advising that, until Success Academy executed the contract, “[Y]ou are 
operating your Pre-K classrooms at your own risk.”136 
By letter dated October 2, 2015, Success Academy objected to the 
proposed contract, to which the DOE replied on October 15, 2015 by stat-
ing that it could not begin payments without signed contracts.137 Success 
Academy then appealed the payment denial to SED Commissioner 
MaryEllen Elia on October 30, 2015.138 
II. THE SUCCESS ACADEMY CHALLENGE 
     A. The Administrative Challenge 
Commissioner Elia reviewed Success Academy’s appeal of the 
DOE’s denial of funds and issued a decision on February 26, 2016.139 
Commissioner Elia considered the merits of Success Academy’s claim 
that the DOE’s refusal to pay for its three schools’ UPK programs without 
an executed contract violated Education Law § 3602-ee(12).140 Success 
 
 130 In re Vera v. Elia, No. 1014-16, 2016 WL 4580093, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 8, 2016). 
 131 Id. at *1. 
 132 The New York Supreme Court opinion noted that the two parties disagreed about the 
date the proposed contracts were sent. Id. at *2 n.1. 
 133 Id. 
 134 See Appeal of De Vera, 55 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 16,882. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. 
 139 See Appeal of De Vera, 55 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 16,882. 
 140 Id. “Notwithstanding paragraph (a) of subdivision one of section [2854] of this chapter 
and paragraph (c) of subdivision two of section [2854] of this chapter, charter schools shall be 
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Academy took the position that neither the state nor city education depart-
ments could conduct monitoring or oversight of pre-kindergarten pro-
grams funded through the UPK law’s grant and procurement process.141 
Success Academy’s position was that its charter entity had exclusive over-
sight authority over its state-funded pre-kindergarten programs.142 Thus, 
Success Academy’s challenge struck at the heart of the quality standards 
that were central to the 2014 UPK law. 
Commissioner Elia’s administrative decision found the DOE’s con-
tractual requirements for pre-kindergarten programs under its SED grant 
to be rational and reasonable.143 The Commissioner noted the following 
statutory requirement under Education Law 3602-ee(2): “[a]ll SUFDPK 
programs must demonstrate quality on eight elements: curriculum; learn-
ing environment, materials and supplies; family engagement; staffing pat-
terns; teacher education and experience; facility quality; physical well-
being, health and nutrition; and partnerships with non-profit, community 
and educational institutions.”144 She determined that this statutory re-
quirement contradicted Success Academy’s argument that, to be paid un-
der the DOE grant, Success Academy need only show (1) approval to 
provide pre-kindergarten instruction and (2) documentation of expendi-
tures.145 Commissioner Elia pointed out that “[t]here must be mechanisms 
in place to ensure that such programs continue to provide quality services 
throughout the grant term.”146 
Acknowledging the voluntary nature of the UPK grant program, 
Commissioner Elia observed that Success Academy chose to respond to 
the DOE’s RFP, sought to participate in the program, and was made aware 
 
eligible to participate in universal full-day pre-kindergarten programs under this section, pro-
vided that all such monitoring, programmatic review and operational requirements under this 
section shall be the responsibility of the charter entity and shall be consistent with the require-
ments under article [56] of this chapter. The provisions of paragraph (b) of subdivision two of 
section [2854] of this chapter shall apply to the admission of pre-kindergarten students, except 
parents of pre-kindergarten children may submit applications for the [2014-2015] school year 
by a date to be determined by the charter school upon selection to participate in the universal 
full-day pre-kindergarten program. The limitations on the employment of uncertified teachers 
under paragraph (a-1) of subdivision three of section [2854] of this chapter shall apply to all 
teachers from pre-kindergarten through grade twelve.” N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3602-ee(12) 
(McKinney 2019). 
 141 See Appeal of De Vera, 55 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 16,882.. 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id. (“Just as the State routinely requires grant recipients to execute contracts as part of 
the State procurement process . . . it is not unreasonable for a school district to require a con-
tract as part of its procurement process.”). 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. 
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of the requirements associated with the grant.147 The Commissioner found 
that the DOE properly required Success Academy NYC to execute the 
contract as a condition of payment under its SUFDPK program.148 
Turning to whether the DOE contract terms were consistent with Ed-
ucation Law Article 56 and § 3602-ee, Commissioner Elia acknowledged 
that Education Law § 3602-ee(12) “states that the monitoring, program-
matic review and operational requirements for SUFDPK programs shall 
be the responsibility of the charter entity, in this case the SUNY trus-
tees.”149 However, she disagreed with Success Academy’s interpretation 
that the intent and effect of Education Law § 3602-ee(12) is to prohibit 
school districts that operate SUFDPK programs under the consolidated 
SED application from regulating pre-kindergarten programs funded 
through the application.150 To take such an interpretation to its logical 
conclusion would mean that the DOE would be required to provide UPK 
funding to charter schools without any mechanism to ensure that the stat-
utorily required eight quality elements are being met, and without any 
mechanism to ensure that public UPK funds are being spent in accordance 
with the requirements of Education Law § 3602-ee, the SED’s RFP, and 
the DOE’S RFP.151 
Commissioner Elia’s decision noted that the DOE’s contract require-
ments were consistent with DOE and SED obligations under Education 
Law § 3602-ee(2) to ensure that providers demonstrate quality in eight 
specific categories.152 The Commissioner rejected Success Academy’s 
objection to various DOE contract provisions (including those that re-
quired discipline be age- and developmentally-appropriate, placed limits 
on computer time and field trips, imposed curriculum and evaluation re-
quirements, and maintained DOE’s rights to inspect, review, and audit 
providers’ sites and to observe and evaluate providers’ programs), instead 
finding that the DOE’s requirements and rationales were all based in 
sound educational policy and were consistent with Education Law 
§ 3602-ee.153 
Commissioner Elia also found that the Success Academy failed to 
articulate any rationale as to how the RFP or DOE contracting require-
ments violated either Article 56 or Education Law § 3602-ee.154 Harmo-
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nizing the DOE’s mandatory provisions for quality standards and over-
sight of UPK programs with Education Law § 3602-ee(12)’s placement 
of charter school monitoring and oversight with the charter entity, the 
Commissioner observed that § 12 does not give charter entities “sole” or 
“exclusive” authority for monitoring and oversight.155 
Commissioner Elia explained: 
To harmonize these seemingly conflicting statutory provisions 
(McKinney’s Statutes § 98), I interpret the language of Education 
Law § 3602-ee(12) as having two effects. First, it clarifies that in 
the case of a charter school, the charter entity is also responsible 
for ensuring that the charter school complies with the require-
ments of the grant, and can invoke the enforcement mechanisms 
under Article 56. Second, it further clarifies that the charter entity 
is the “oversight agency” responsible for conducting at least one 
inspection under Education Law § 3602-ee(10) in order to moni-
tor, engage in programmatic review and enforce the operational 
requirements of the program.156 
Commissioner Elia’s decision also rejected Success Academy’s ar-
guments that the DOE’s contract is illegal, noting that its argument that a 
charter school could voluntarily apply for a grant of state funds, assert a 
blanket exemption from grant requirements, and still be entitled to the 
funds, is irrational, contrary to legislative intent, and contrary to public 
policy.157 
In response to Commissioner Elia’s determination, Success Acad-
emy filed suit.158 
B. The Court Challenges 
Success Academy sued under C.P.L.R. Article 78 to annul the Com-
missioner’s decision; order the Commissioner to require the DOE to pay 
Success Academy for its UPK classes; and order the Commissioner to 
invalidate the DOE UPK contract.159 
 
 155 Id. “To interpret that language to divest DOE of its role in inspecting the charter school 
program as the school district’s partner under Education Law § 3602-ee(10), or to so limit the 
scope of its inspection to make it superficial and meaningless, would conflict with the provi-
sion of Article 56 that gives the school district of location the authority to ‘visit, examine into 
and inspect’ the charter school for the ‘purpose of ensuring that the school is in compliance 
with all applicable laws, . . .’ namely Education Law § 2853(2-a), or in the case of charter 
schools formed by respondent’s Chancellor as charter entity, Education Law § 2853(2) . . . .” 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. 
 158 In re Vera v. Elia, No. 1014-16, 2016 WL 4580093 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 8, 2016). 
 159 Id. at *1. 
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After conducting a thorough review of the facts alleged on both sides 
and considering all of the relevant provisions of the UPK laws, the Char-
ter School Act, and other relevant laws and regulations, Judge Raymond 
Elliot of the Albany County Supreme Court determined that the Commis-
sioner’s decision was rational, and not arbitrary and capricious.160 The 
Court agreed with the Commissioner that the legislature opted to distin-
guish between pre-kindergarten and grades K-12 for purposes of the char-
ter school law, treating UPK as a “program” rather than a “grade.”161 
Therefore, Education Law § 3602-ee(12)’s proviso “that all such moni-
toring, programmatic review and operational requirements under this sec-
tion shall be the responsibility of the charter entity and shall be consistent 
with the requirements under article fifty-six of this chapter” did not oper-
ate to eviscerate the remaining requirements of the UPK law.162 The trial 
Court also found that the 2014 UPK law’s detailed quality standards, 
grant process, and inspection requirements all evidenced a “clear legisla-
tive intent towards inclusive oversight of charter school Pre-K providers 
by the Education Department and the local school districts, as well as the 
charter entity, pursuant to subsection 12.”163 The Court also found that it 
was reasonable for the DOE to require that Success Academy execute a 
contract ensuring that the UPK public funds granted to it by the State were 
appropriately used.164 Reading all of the provisions of the relevant statutes 
with an eye toward harmonizing them, the court determined that § 3602-
ee(12) “does not void or invalidate the other provisions of Education Law 
§ 3602-ee relating to oversight of the Pre-K programs. Subsection 12 does 
not state that the charter entity has exclusive oversight over charter school 
Pre-K programs.”165 
Success Academy then appealed to the Appellate Division Third De-
partment, which overturned the lower court’s decision.166 The Third De-
partment first determined that no deference need be accorded to the Com-
missioner’s interpretation of Education Law § 3602-ee because the 
question presented was one of “pure statutory reading and analysis, de-
pendent only on accurate apprehension of legislative intent” and there was 
“little basis to rely on any special competence or expertise of the admin-
istrative agency.”167 The Third Department then focused almost exclu-
sively on § 3603-ee(12), determining that it “unambiguously provides 
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 166 DeVera v. Elia, 152 A.D.3d 13, 22 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017). 
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charter entities with authority in regard to the programing [sic] and oper-
ations of prekindergarten programs funded pursuant to the statute.”168 Fo-
cusing on that provision and its use of the word “all,” the Third Depart-
ment determined that “use of the term ‘all’ tasked the charter entity with 
full responsibility for the relevant ‘monitoring, programmatic review and 
operational requirements’ for the relevant prekindergarten programs.”169 
Determining that consideration of the remaining provisions of the UPK 
law had no effect on its reading of subsection 12, the Third Department 
reversed the lower court decision.170 
The SED and the DOE then appealed to New York’s highest court.171 
Refusing to give weight to SED and DOE interpretations of UPK and 
charter school laws, a majority of the Court of Appeals determined that 
Education Law § 3602-ee(12)172 prohibited the DOE from imposing 
standards consistent with the UPK law on charter schools as a condition 
of funding.173 In an opinion by Judge Garcia, a majority of the Court of 
Appeals agreed with the Third Department that deference to Commis-
sioner Elia’s interpretation of the relevant statutes was unwarranted.174 
Characterizing the question as “one of pure statutory interpretation,” the 
Court said that it “need not accord any deference to the agency’s determi-
nation and can undertake its function of statutory construction.”175 The 
majority went on to say that the case “turns on subdivision (12) of the 
Universal Pre-K Law which provides that, for charter school prekinder-
garten programs, ‘all . . . monitoring, programmatic review and opera-
tional requirements . . . shall be the responsibility of the charter entity and 
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full-day pre-kindergarten programs under this section, provided that all such monitoring, pro-
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 174 Id. at 434. 
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(2002)). 
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shall be consistent with the requirements under article [56] of this chap-
ter.’”176 
The majority focused on a very narrow, textual interpretation of one 
section of the UPK law, ignoring the overall purpose of the UPK law and 
rejecting interpretive approaches that harmonized all provisions of that 
law to support the clear legislative goal of ensuring high-quality UPK. 
The majority instead read subsection 12 as overriding all other provisions 
of the UPK law. By mechanically focusing on one provision of the UPK 
law, this approach refused to consider the law’s overall legislative pur-
pose and how it might harmonize competing goals of including charter 
schools while maintaining quality standards across all providers. In doing 
so, the majority privileged charter school autonomy over all other public 
values expressed in the UPK statutes. 
In a thoughtful and well-reasoned dissent, Judge Jenny Rivera noted 
that the majority had read the provision relating to charter eligibility with-
out considering adequately the context of the 2014 and 1997 UPK laws 
and the charter school law.177 In Judge Rivera’s view, the full statutory 
framework should be considered when discerning the legislature’s intent 
with respect to oversight of pre-kindergarten providers.178 Lacking such 
context, the majority failed to recognize that the SED and the DOE were 
not seeking to “impose requirements on charter schools that contradict 
[§ ] 3602-ee(12) . . . but rather to exercise their coextensive authority 
within that framework” as a means of harmonizing relevant statutes.179 
Judge Rivera observed that the majority’s interpretation could be read to 
lead “to the absurd result of stripping charter school oversight from the 
SED—the sole entity legislatively charged with approving grants for pre-
k programs in accordance with its own scoring system and developing 
statewide inspection and quality assurance protocols mandated for pro-
vider annual inspections.”180 Judge Rivera’s dissent suggested that the ap-
propriate focus for the relevant statutory question was to read the statute 
as a whole and in context, work to harmonize provisions that are in ten-
sion, and give weight to the SED and DOE interpretation where there is 
ambiguity.181 In addition to these legal principles, Judge Rivera recog-
nized the troubling policy implications of exempting charter schools from 
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key quality standards and monitoring requirements expressed in the 2014 
UPK law.182 
III. MATTER OF DEVERA’S LEGAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
A central issue in Matter of DeVera was whether, as Success Acad-
emy claimed, charter schools are exempt by law from the quality stand-
ards and oversight requirements set forth in New York’s UPK law. De-
spite clear evidence of the legislature’s focus on assuring quality 
standards in the implementation of the UPK grant process,183 Judge Gar-
cia’s majority opinion focused almost exclusively on a single provision 
of the 2014 UPK law designed to include charter schools in that grant 
process.184 Read in isolation, that provision appears to limit program over-
sight to the designated charter entity.185 Yet read in the context of the stat-
ute as a whole, which includes provisions that set forth robust quality 
standards and vest oversight in the SED and the DOE, the import of the 
charter school provision is far from clear.186 Also at issue is the appropri-
ate interplay of the 2014 UPK law with the New York State Charter 
Schools Act, which by its terms applies only to grades K-12.187 
 
 182 “[T]his level of independence would undermine the 2014 Pre-K Law’s centralized 
quality control apparatus by which consolidated applications are preferred and district pro-
gramming prioritized for funding, as well as the obligation of school districts to evaluate and 
inspect its providers for compliance with the quality elements set forth in [§ ] 3602-ee (2) and 
the SED’s quality assurance and inspection protocols designed in satisfaction of the mandates 
of [§ ] 3602-ee(6).” Id. at 456-57. 
 183 See id. at 440 (citing Memorandum of State Educ. Dep’t, Bill Jacket, L. 1997, Ch. 436; 
N.Y. STATE COMPTROLLER, THE 1997-98 BUDGET: FISCAL REVIEW AND ANALYSIS (1997); 
Gomez-Velez, supra note 5, at 330-331 (2015)). 
 184 Matter of DeVera, 32 N.Y.3d at 434. 
 185 See N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3602-ee(12) (McKinney 2019) ( “[C]harter schools shall be el-
igible to participate in universal full-day pre-kindergarten programs under this section, pro-
vided that all such monitoring, programmatic review and operational requirements under this 
section shall be the responsibility of the charter entity . . . .”). 
 186 For example, subdivision two provides that “[a]ll universal full-day pre-kindergarten 
programs shall demonstrate quality on the following elements: (a) curriculum; (b) learning 
environment, materials and supplies; (c) family engagement; (d) staffing patterns; (e) teacher 
education and experience; (f) facility quality; (g) physical well-being, health and nutrition; 
and (h) partnerships with non-profit, community and educational institutions.” EDUC. LAW 
§ 3602-ee(2). Subdivision three refers to consolidated applications by school districts that in-
clude charter schools among a range of providers. Id. § 3602-ee(3). These provisions are at 
odds with a reading of subdivision 12 that provides for exclusive charter entity oversight of 
charter-operated UPK programs. Id. § 3602-ee(12). 
 187 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2854(2)(c) (McKinney 2019) (“A charter school shall serve one or 
more of the grades one through twelve, and shall limit admission to pupils within the grade 
levels served. Nothing herein shall prohibit a charter school from establishing a kindergarten 
program.”). 
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As noted above, the standards and oversight provisions included in 
the 2014 UPK law are detailed and robust, and were based on research 
demonstrating that high-quality programs are essential to meeting UPK 
goals of making young students school-ready and helping to close educa-
tional opportunity gaps.188 Judge Garcia’s majority opinion in DeVera 
thus raises significant legal and policy issues that are not limited to the 
interpretation and implementation of the UPK law. First, the opinion 
raises questions about the appropriate approach to statutory interpretation 
in New York State (including textualist, purposivist, and mixed ap-
proaches),189 the weight given to agency expertise, and how long-standing 
principles of statutory interpretation are applied. The majority opinion 
also raises serious concerns about the ability of New York’s UPK pro-
grams to ensure quality standards for charter schools; the disparate treat-
ment of charter schools and other UPK providers; and the Court’s view 
of the relationship between legal interpretation, policy interpretation, and 
public law effects. These legal and policy implications will be considered 
in turn. 
A. New York Statutory Interpretation – Textual and Contextual 
Legislative Intent 
As a legal matter, a key question in Matter of DeVera is ascertaining 
legislative intent.  Specifically, whether it is appropriate to read a single 
provision like § 3602-ee(12) in isolation, or whether that provision must 
be read within the broader context of the statutory scheme. This would 
include the legislature’s overarching intent to ensure high-quality pre-kin-
dergarten programs while also including charter school providers,and the 
apparent tension this creates. 
Significant scholarly attention has been paid to methods and tools of 
statutory construction and interpretation.190 Much of that attention focuses 
 
 188 See POTTER, CENTURY FOUND., supra note 11, at 3-4. 
 189 See, e.g., VALERIE C. BRANNON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45153, STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION: THEORIES, TOOLS, AND TRENDS (2018), https://perma.cc/ATU9-CW2W. 
“The two theories of statutory interpretation that predominate today are purposivism and tex-
tualism. Proponents of both theories generally share the goal of adhering to Congress’s in-
tended meaning, but disagree about how best to achieve that goal. Judges subscribing to these 
theories may employ different interpretive tools to discover Congress’s meaning, looking to 
the ordinary meaning of the disputed statutory text, its statutory context, any applicable inter-
pretive canons, the legislative history of the provision, and evidence about how the statute has 
been or may be implemented.” Id. at 2-3 (citations omitted). 
 190 See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. 
L. REV. 2027 (2002); Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: 
Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750 (2010); 
Abbe R. Gluck & Robert A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation on the Bench: A Survey of Forty-
Two Judges on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1298 (2018); Adam M. 
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on whether judges are to serve as “faithful agents” of legislatures191 and 
what that means.192 That query relates to broader institutional questions 
about the relative roles of the legislature, executive, and judiciary in stat-
utory construction and interpretation, including whether “judges should 
exercise a kind of expansive judgment that sustains values of the legal 
system as a whole and operates as a check on misguided or out-of-date 
statutory provisions.”193 Courts often are faced with interpretive choices, 
including whether the “clear text” or “plain language” in a statute is at 
odds with the legislative purpose.194 Yet, as several scholars have noted, 
“[a]fter centuries of judicial and scholarly effort, ‘the hard truth of the 
matter is that American courts have no intelligible, generally accepted, 
and consistently applied theory of statutory interpretation.’”195 
This has led some scholars and jurists to advance textualist or for-
malist theories of statutory construction and interpretation. Proposals to 
simplify and make more uniform the process of statutory interpretation 
include a “Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation,”196 a “Restatement 
of Statutory Interpretation,”197 and the application of stare decisis princi-
ples to interpretations of specific statutes.198 
Others view trends in statutory interpretation, such as the current em-
phasis on textualism, as driven by an overarching desire to limit judicial 
 
Samaha, If the Text Is Clear – Lexical Ordering in Statutory Interpretation, 94 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 155 (2018); Glen Staszewski, The Dumbing Down of Statutory Interpretation, 95 B.U. 
L. REV. 209 (2015). 
 191 “A central ambition of most theories of statutory interpretation is to ensure that judges 
act as faithful agents of the legislature—a role that requires courts to subordinate their own 
values to those of their principals. ‘Purposivist’ theories demand that judges do so by deciding 
statutory cases in accordance with the purpose or intent of the legislature.” Richard H. Fallon, 
Jr., Three Symmetries Between Textualist and Purposivist Theories of Statutory Interpreta-
tion—and the Irreducible Roles of Values and Judgment Within Both, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 
685, 686 (2014). 
 192 See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW INTERPRETATION 21 
(2013) (“The most common assumption about the judiciary’s role in dealing with statutes is 
that judges should be ‘faithful agents’ of legislatures.”). 
 193 Id.; see also Robert A. Katzmann, Madison Lecture: Statutes, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 637, 
661-82 (2012). 
 194 Carlos E. Gonzalez, Turning Unambiguous Statutory Materials into Ambiguous Stat-
utes: Ordering Principles, Avoidance, and Transparent Justification in Cases of Interpretive 
Choice, 61 DUKE L.J. 583 passim (2011). 
 195 Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. 
REV. 2085, 2086 (2002) (quoting HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL 
PROCESS 1169 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994)). 
 196 Id. at 2089. 
 197 Gary E. O’Connor, Restatement (First) of Statutory Interpretation, 7 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. 
& PUB. POL’Y 333, 334 (2004). 
 198 Randy J. Kozel, Statutory Interpretation, Administrative Deference, and the Law of 
Stare Decisis, 97 TEX. L. REV. 1125, 1146 (2019). 
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discretion, and as contrary to important jurisprudential goals. Glen 
Staszewski posits: 
While the meaning of a statute is important and should generally 
be followed, a host of other factors will ordinarily be relevant 
when agencies and judges make their interpretive decisions, in-
cluding the legislative history of the statute, its underlying pur-
poses, applicable legal precedent, canons of construction, consti-
tutional norms, related statutory provisions and common law 
principles, a potentially broad range of policy considerations, and 
how things have changed since a statute was enacted. From this 
perspective, neither agencies nor courts are “ascertaining the 
meaning of the law” when they interpret statutes in the modern 
regulatory state. Rather, agencies are carrying out their delegated 
authority to implement statutory programs, while courts are gen-
erally reviewing the legality of an agency’s decisions. Agencies 
are making policy decisions within the constraints provided by 
Congress, and the judiciary is providing the people with opportu-
nities to contest the validity of those exercises of governmental 
authority.199 
Other critiques of proposals to restrict statutory interpretation to a 
textualist exercise in discerning plain meaning, or the application of static 
rules, argue that such proposals fail to acknowledge that interpretation to 
discern intent occurs in all language and communication.200 Such pro-
posals also fail to note that there may be a difference between what a stat-
ute says and what the legislature meant, based on either mistake or a fail-
ure to foresee certain consequences; this can create a gap between text 
and intent even when it may be argued that the statutory text is clear.201 
Staszewski proposes that judicial discretion in statutory interpretation 
 
 199 Staszewski, supra note 190, at 262. 
 200 See, e.g., Lawrence M. Solan, Private Language, Public Laws: The Central Role of 
Legislative Intent in Statutory Interpretation, 93 GEO. L.J. 427, 484 (2005) (arguing that “the 
distinction between the language of a statute and the intent of the legislature is largely a false 
one. All we can do when we interpret language is hope that we have absorbed whatever a 
speaker or writer has intended to convey. If intent is basically all that interpretation is about, 
then there is no point in positing rules pretending to avoid it.”). 
 201 “We all have experiences like, ‘Did I say Tuesday? I meant Thursday.’ Alternatively, 
we sometimes believe that we were mistaken when, in retrospect, we failed to think through 
the consequences of our statements in unforeseen circumstances. The two types of mistake are 
quite different, and textualists draw a distinction between them. In the first instance, the person 
says, ‘I didn’t mean to say what I said.’ In the second, the person says, ‘I meant to say what I 
said, but now I see that it was a very bad idea.’ Sometimes, in the statutory context, it is not 
easy to tell which one occurred. One may come to different conclusions about which if either 
of these types of error should be corrected judicially. But it is difficult to avoid the conclusion 
that intent is relevant to the analysis.” Id. at 461. 
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should not be seen as a problem, but rather as a means to prevent the pos-
sibility of domination by the state and to promote democracy by encour-
aging practical reasoning and a diversity of views.202 He notes that “to 
perform this function, statutory interpretation must take place in an infor-
mation-rich environment in which decision-makers consider a wide range 
of interests and perspectives.”203 While there is a rich and varied scholarly 
discussion of federal statutory interpretation and the federal structure,204 
relatively less scholarship examines statutory interpretation under state 
law,205 including whether its principles and canons should align with or 
diverge from those under federal law.206 Former New York State Chief 
Judge Judith S. Kaye observed that there are issues “distinctly germane 
to the interpretation of state statutes.”207 Judge Kaye noted that there are 
far more state statutory interpretation cases than there are federal for the 
simple reason that there are far more state cases in general.208 She also 
pointed to the relative sparseness of legislative history in New York as 
compared to the federal system.209 Judge Kaye identified the “state courts’ 
unique role in shaping the common law” as “inevitably linked to their 
function of interpreting statutes” in a “complex fabric defining a wide 
 
 202 Staszewski, supra note 190, at 242-249. 
 203 Id. at 261. 
 204 See, e.g., Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law 
Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 19-20 (1995) (“[Scholarly 
statutory interpretation] analysis has focused almost entirely on how federal courts read fed-
eral statutes. Few, if any, of the recent commentators have considered whether the subject of 
statutory interpretation presents a different set of issues for state judges reading state stat-
utes.”). 
 205 See Judith S. Kaye, Things Judges Do: State Statutory Interpretation, 13 TOURO L. 
REV. 595, 598-99 (1997) (noting the dearth of scholarship on state statutory interpretation and 
the differences between federal and state statutory interpretation, in spite of the fact that “there 
are far more state statutory interpretation cases than federal”). But see Abbe R. Gluck, The 
States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New 
Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750 passim (2010) (examining some state high court 
statutory interpretation approaches, including examples of the use of stare decisis and rules of 
construction); Michael Pappas, No Two-Stepping in the Laboratories: State Deference Stand-
ards and Their Implications for Improving the Chevron Doctrine, 39 MCGEORGE L. REV. 977 
passim (2008) (discussing state courts’ doctrines of judicial review of agency interpretation 
and comparing them to the federal Chevron doctrine). 
 206 See Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” 
and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898 passim (2011) (noting that federal courts routinely 
overlook state interpretive principles when they are tasked with interpreting state law, and that 
even the U.S. Supreme Court does not treat its own statements regarding federal statutory 
interpretation principles as precedential). 
 207 Kaye, supra note 205, at 599. 
 208 Id. 
 209 Id. at 600. 
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range of rights and duties.”210 Finally, Judge Kaye noted as a significant 
difference between the state and federal systems that there is usually “a 
closer relationship between the distinctly separate branches of state gov-
ernment than at the federal level,” describing a dynamic dialogue that 
sometimes takes place between state legislatures and courts.211 
While Chief Judge Kaye adhered to the well-settled notion that the 
“oath and obligation of every judge” is to “bend to the legislative com-
mand,”212 she nevertheless emphasized: 
My concern, however, is with the next sentiment: that judges—
proper, well-behaved judges—are obliged simply to apply the 
words of statutes as they are written; that they must ask only what 
statutes say and not what the drafters meant; that anything beyond 
the technical exercise of applying sections of a code to facts of a 
case smacks of activism and overreaching—in other words, that 
judges are on the prowl for opportunities to wrest ambiguity from 
the jaws of clarity. Based on my own experience, I simply cannot 
agree that statutory interpretation is such a mechanical exercise, 
or that the proper path of an honorable judge is so confined.213 
Judge Kaye considered carefully the judge’s role in discerning leg-
islative intent under New York law, including the application of common 
law principles to address ambiguity and give attention to the key purposes 
of the relevant law: 
When the meaning of a statute is in dispute, there remains at the 
core the same common-law process of discerning and applying 
the purpose of the law. As one commentator noted, “courts have 
not only a law-finding function . . . but [also] . . . a law-making 
function that engrafts on the statute meaning appropriate to re-
solving the controversy.” Indeed, “there is no sharp break of 
method in passing from ‘common law,’ old style, to the combina-
tions of decisional and statutory law now familiar. Statutes, after 
all, need to be interpreted, filled in, related to the rest of the cor-
pus.”214 
 
 210 Id. at 601 (quoting DAVID L. SHAPIRO, CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 937 (1992)). 
 211 Id. at 601-02. 
 212 Kaye, supra note 205, at 604. 
 213 Id. at 605. 
 214 Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts 
Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 25 (1995) (citing Reed Dickerson, 
Statutory Interpretation: Dipping into Legislative History, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1125, 1127-
28 (1983) and Benjamin Kaplan, Encounters with O.W. Holmes, Jr., 96 HARV. L. REV. 1828, 
1845 (1983)). 
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Judge Kaye notes the judiciary’s obligation to follow statutory mean-
ing and legislative intent particularly when the “plain meaning” of a stat-
ute dictates a particular result, but she cautions that this is not a “mechan-
ical exercise,” and “[a]t times the common-law method compels courts 
even to read a statute in a way that appears contrary to its ‘plain mean-
ing.’”215 This is often the case in a state’s highest court, where “[t]he very 
fact that a controversy over statutory interpretation has found its way to a 
state’s high court—quite possibly after several other trial and appellate 
judges have divided on the question—signals that discerning the statutory 
meaning may not be quite so simple.”216 
New York State’s canons of statutory interpretation generally ex-
press a similar path. They provide that it is “fundamental that a court, in 
interpreting a statute, should attempt to effectuate the intent of the Legis-
lature.”217 This first principle of statutory interpretation explains that the 
court’s role is to discern and effectuate the legislature’s intent, not to ap-
ply its own policy in a given situation. In ascertaining legislative intent, 
the court must start with the text of the statute itself. When the statute is 
clear, or when legislative intent is clearly ascertainable, the legislature’s 
intent must be followed. Thus, the crux of many statutory interpretation 
questions lies in determining whether the statute clearly addresses the is-
sue at hand, and if not, determining what the legislature intended. 
Statutory text is not to be read piecemeal or in isolation. Rather, un-
der well-settled principles of statutory interpretation, a statute is to be 
viewed as a whole, and “its various sections must be considered together 
and with reference to each other.”218 A court must consider a statute as a 
whole, reading and construing all parts of an act together to determine 
legislative intent,219 and should attempt to “harmonize[ ] [all parts of a 
statute] with each other . . . and [give] effect and meaning . . . to the entire 
statute and every part and word thereof.”220 
Where a potential conflict exists, all parts of the statute must be given 
meaning and effect and, if possible, must be “harmonized to achieve the 
 
 215 Id. at 26. 
 216 Id. at 27. 
 217 Patrolmen’s Benevolent Ass’n of City of N.Y. v. City of New York, 41 N.Y.2d 205, 
207 (1976); see also N.Y. STAT. LAW § 92(a) (McKinney 2019). 
 218 People v. Mobil Oil Corp., 48 N.Y.2d 192, 199 (1979); see also STAT. LAW §§ 92, 97, 
98. 
 219 STAT. LAW § 97. 
 220 Friedman v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 9 N.Y.3d 105, 115 (2007) (quoting STAT. LAW 
§ 98). 
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legislative purpose.”221 Similarly, when a statute is part of a broader leg-
islative scheme, its language must be construed “in context and in a man-
ner that harmonizes the related provisions and renders them compati-
ble.”222 Unlike a small number of state courts that impose a strict textualist 
approach to statutory interpretation, New York courts practice both tex-
tual and contextual methods of statutory interpretation.223 
Applying these principles to Education Law § 3602-ee, it becomes 
apparent that  to realize the UPK law’s broader legislative purpose, sub-
section 12’s provision making charter schools eligible to participate in 
UPK programs (with charter entity oversight) must be harmonized with 
other programmatic provisions of the UPK law. Those provisions include 
the 2014 UPK law’s requirements that “[a]ll universal full-day pre-kin-
dergarten programs shall demonstrate quality” on curriculum; learning 
environment, materials and supplies; family engagement; staffing pat-
terns; teacher education and experience; facility quality; physical well-
being, health and nutrition; and partnerships with non-profit, community 
and educational institutions.224 They also include provisions for grant 
awards,225 a statewide inspection protocol for annual inspections of all 
universal full-day pre-kindergarten providers,226 and an inspection provi-
sion that says: 
Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, a universal 
full-day pre-kindergarten provider shall be inspected by the de-
partment, the school district with which it partners, if any, and its 
respective licensing, permitting, regulatory, oversight, registra-
tion or enrolling agency or entity no fewer than two times per 
school year, at least one inspection of which shall be performed 
by the eligible agency’s respective licensing, permitting, regula-
tory, oversight, registration or enrolling agency, as applicable.227 
 
 221 Sanders v. Winship, 57 N.Y.2d 391, 395-96; see also In re M.B., 6 N.Y.3d 437, 447 
(2006); Kosmider v. Whitney, 34 N.Y.3d 48, 54-55 (2019) (analyzing a broader statutory 
scheme to determine whether there was a clear legislative intent to establish a FOIL exception 
through the enactment of Election Law § 3-222). 
 222 Mestecky v. City of New York, 30 N.Y.3d 239, 243 (2017) (quoting In re M.B., 6 
N.Y.3d at 447); see also Heard v. Cuomo, 80 N.Y.2d 684, 689 (1993); Sanders v. Winship, 
57 N.Y.2d 391, 395-96 (1982); Till v. APEX Rehab., 144 A.D.3d 1231, 1232-33 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2016). 
 223 See Gluck, supra note 190, at 1860 n.403 (describing New York as one of several 
“states that appear resistant to a text-based approach” to statutory interpretation). 
 224 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3602-ee(2) (McKinney 2019). 
 225 Id. § 3602-ee(3). 
 226 Id. § 3602-ee(6). 
 227 Id. § 3602-ee(10). 
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In reviewing Success Academy’s Challenge to DOE oversight, both 
the Commissioner of Education and the trial court applied a contextual 
view of statutory interpretation that sought to harmonize related provi-
sions and allow for the inclusion of the UPK law’s broader goals.228 The 
Commissioner and the trial court also balanced the UPK law’s inclusion 
of charter schools as grant-eligible with the statute’s articulation of 
broader quality and oversight goals.229 
By contrast, the Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals major-
ity elected to focus on one provision of the UPK law without closely con-
sidering that provision’s interaction with other sections of the UPK law, 
or with the Charter Schools Act.230 By focusing on a single provision in 
the UPK law and ignoring the broader context of both laws and the ambi-
guity created by tensions between them, the Court of Appeals failed to 
give sufficient effect to legislative intent. In doing so, the majority opin-
ion creates confusion. Worse yet, it may signal a retreat from a more ro-
bust, contextual approach to statutory interpretation that considers legis-
lative intent in a manner that is cognizant of the actual goals of the 
statutory scheme, rather than merely engaging in a mechanical exercise. 
B.  Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Statutes They 
Implement 
Another question raised by Matter of DeVera is whether, and to what 
degree, the Court should have deferred to the SED and DOE interpreta-
tions of the UPK statutes as they relate to oversight of charter schools. 
New York’s formulation of the standard of deference given to 
agency interpretations of statutes they are charged with administering 
bears some similarities to, and some key differences from, the federal 
standard known as Chevron deference.231 Chevron deference is a canon 
of statutory interpretation that is applied when Congress delegates power 
to an agency to carry out a regulatory scheme, with the understanding that 
the agency will apply its experience and expertise in implementing and 
interpreting its governing statute.232 When an agency‘s interpretation of 
 
 228 Appeal of De Vera, 55 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 16,882; In re Vera v. Elia, No. 1014-
16, 2016 WL 4580093, at *10-*12 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 08, 2016). 
 229 Appeal of De Vera, 55 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 16,882; In re Vera, 2016 WL 
4580093 at *11. 
 230 DeVera v. Elia, 152 A.D.3d 13, 19-21 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017); Matter of DeVera v. 
Elia, 32 N.Y.3d 423, 434-36 (2018). 
 231 See generally Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984). 
 232 See, e.g., LARRY M. EIG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R97-589, STATUTORY INTERP-
RETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 27-31 (2014), https://perma.cc/K82W-
6E8T. 
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ambiguity in its governing statute is expressed in a manner carrying the 
force of law (through rulemaking or adjudication), a reviewing court will 
defer to the agency’s interpretation as long as it is permissible or reason-
able.233 
Under Chevron, a court reviewing an agency interpretation of a stat-
ute it implements is faced with the following questions. First, at what has 
become known as “Chevron step zero,” has Congress delegated to the 
agency authority to interpret the statute in a manner carrying the force of 
law, and has the agency exercised that authority in the interpretation at 
issue?234 If so, the court then asks, at Chevron step one, has Congress has 
spoken to the precise question at issue?235 If Congress has clearly ad-
dressed the statutory question presented, that interpretation must stand; 
both the agency and the court must abide by Congress’ clear statutory 
direction.236 If, on the other hand, Congress has not spoken to the precise 
question at issue, a reviewing court is to defer to the agency’s interpreta-
tion of the statute so long as it is reasonable.237 This is known as Chevron 
“strong deference.”238 
The theory behind such deference is that where Congress has 
charged an agency with implementing a statutory scheme that contains 
ambiguities, Congress has implicitly delegated authority to the agency to 
fill any “gap left by Congress” such that the agency’s reasonable interpre-
tation should be upheld.239 Much of Chevron’s rationale is based on the 
notion that an agency’s experience and expertise in a particular area of 
law places it in a better position to discern and carry out Congress’ in-
tent.240 
 
 233 Id. at 27-28. 
 234 See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 195 (2006) (“Chevron 
applies to agency decisions having the force of law or backed by relatively formal procedures, 
while requiring a case-by-case inquiry into whether Chevron applies to less formal agency 
action.”). 
 235 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. 
 236 Id. 
 237 Id. at 843. 
 238 See, e.g., Cetto v. LaSalle Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 518 F.3d 263, 274 (4th Cir. 2008) (stating 
that “under specifically applicable statutory provisions and Supreme Court holdings . . . strong 
deference” must be accorded to the challenged agency interpretation). 
 239 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866. 
 240 Id. at 865. It is worth noting that Chevron deference currently stands on somewhat 
shaky ground. Several Supreme Court justices have expressed skepticism of, if not outright 
disdain for, the doctrine, and some have explicitly advocated for its demise. See, e.g., Baldwin 
v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 690 (2020) (Thomas, J. dissenting from denial of certiorari) (ar-
guing that the Supreme Court’s decisions in both National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. 
v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005)—a decision Justice Thomas authored—and 
Chevron should be overruled as unconstitutional on separation-of-powers grounds and on the 
grounds that they are inconsistent with the federal Administrative Procedure Act.). 
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New York’s approach to judicial deference to agency interpretations 
of statutes they administer bears some similarities to Chevron deference, 
deferring in cases involving questions within the agency’s special com-
petence, while leaving pure statutory questions to courts. For example, 
the Court of Appeals has said that “‘an agency’s interpretation of the stat-
utes it administers must be upheld absent demonstrated irrationality or 
unreasonableness,’ but where ‘the question is one of pure statutory read-
ing and analysis . . . there is little basis to rely on any special competence 
or expertise of the administrative agency.’”241 New York courts state the 
deference test differently and call for a distinct (but in some ways Chev-
ron-related) analysis. 
In New York, the rule relating to judicial review of agency interpre-
tations of statutes they are charged with implementing has been stated as 
follows: 
Although the proper interpretation of a statute ordinarily presents 
an issue of law reserved for the courts, this Court has recognized 
that “[a]n administrative agency’s interpretation of the statute it is 
charged with implementing is entitled to varying degrees of judi-
cial deference depending upon the extent to which the interpreta-
tion relies upon the special competence the agency is presumed to 
have developed in its administration of the statute.”242 
Thus, the basis for judicial deference to agency statutory interpreta-
tions in New York centers largely on the degree to which a correct statu-
tory interpretation would benefit from the agency’s experience and com-
petence in administering the statute.243 This includes the agency’s 
operational implementation of the statute: “[W]here the interpretation of 
a statute or its application involves knowledge and understanding of un-
derlying operational practices or entails an evaluation of factual data and 
 
 241 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Roth, 99 N.Y.2d 316, 321 (2003) (quoting Seittelman v. 
Sabol, 91 N.Y.2d 618, 625 (1998)). 
 242 Claim of Gruber, 89 N.Y.2d 225, 231 (1996) (quoting Rosen v. Pub. Empl. Relations 
Bd., 72 N.Y.2d 42, 46 (1988)). 
 243 This standard reads much like the “sliding scale” of deference applied under federal 
law to informal (or “non-force of law”) agency interpretations of statutes they implement, 
known as Mead/Skidmore deference (based on the Supreme Court’s resurrection in U.S. v. 
Mead Corp., 533 U.S 218 (2001), of the pre-Chevron deference standard applied in Skidmore 
v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944)). However, unlike federal Mead/Skidmore deference, New 
York courts do not explicitly cite a difference in the degree of deference afforded based on 
whether the agency interpretation carries the force of law, nor do they cite the same factors 
articulated in Mead (as based on Skidmore): “The weight [accorded to an administrative judg-
ment] in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the 
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factors which give it the power to persuade, if lacking power to control.” Mead, 533 U.S. at 
228 (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140). 
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inferences to be drawn therefrom[,] the courts regularly defer to the gov-
ernmental agency charged with the responsibility for administration of the 
statute.”244 Under the New York standard, “[w]hen such deference is ap-
propriate,” the courts will uphold an agency’s interpretation of a provision 
so long as the interpretation “is supported by a rational basis.”245  
While providing for deference to agency experience and expertise 
when deemed relevant to the interpretation, New York courts will not de-
fer to agency statutory interpretations where “the question is one of pure 
statutory reading and analysis, dependent only on accurate apprehension 
of legislative intent.”246 The theory is that in such circumstances, “there 
is little basis to rely on any special competence or expertise of the admin-
istrative agency,” and the court may instead rely on its own interpretation 
of the statutory language and legislative intent.247 
While similar to the question posed under Chevron step one, New 
York’s formulation of the deference question differs. . Rather than posing 
the question as one of statutory ambiguity that presumably leaves gaps 
for the agency to fill, the focus is on whether the question is one of “pure 
statutory reading and analysis.” This gives reviewing courts a great deal 
of leeway in deciding whether to consider agency expertise. This frame-
work also permits courts to ignore the value that agency experience may 
add to questions of legislative intent simply by characterizing a matter as 
one involving questions of pure statutory reading and analysis. For exam-
ple, Judge Garcia’s majority opinion in Matter of DeVera ignores very 
useful insight into how New York’s UPK program is implemented and 
how the various relevant laws interact in practice. The majority opinion 
characterizes the question as one of pure statutory interpretation, declin-
ing to defer to or even closely consider the fact- and policy-based inter-
pretive approach taken by the New York State Commissioner of Educa-
tion. Instead, it mechanically relies on an isolated  statutory provision 
deemed to be “clear.”248 
 
 244 Kurcsics v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 49 N.Y.2d 451, 459 (1980); see also Indus. Liai-
son Comm. v. Williams, 72 N.Y.2d 137, 144 (1988) (“Our reasoning does not mean that an 
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applied only where such expertise is relevant. It is not in this case.”). 
 245 Claim of Gruber, 89 N.Y.2d at 231 (citing Fisher v. Levine, 36 N.Y.2d, 146, 150 
(1975); Matter of Van Teslaar (Levine), 35 N.Y.2d 311, 318 (1974)). 
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 247 Claim of Gruber, 89 N.Y.2d at 231-32 (1996) (quoting Kurcsics, 49 N.Y.2d at 459); 
see also Van Teslaar, 35 N.Y.2d at 318; Matter of Ferrara, 10 N.Y.2d 1, 7 (1961). 
 248 Matter of DeVera, 32 N.Y.3d, 423, 434 (2018). 
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C. Legal Implications of Matter of DeVera 
     Matter of DeVera calls for the Court to re-examine and clarify its 
approach to statutory interpretation, including how it considers the entire 
statutory scheme and the weight it gives to how  agencies interpret statu-
tory schemes they  implement. A defining feature of the DeVera major-
ity’s opinion is its conclusion that the legislature had spoken clearly on 
the question of charter schools’ exemption from UPK oversight require-
ments.249 This narrow, mechanical approach to statutory interpretation 
strays from the richer, more nuanced approach to ascertaining legislative 
intent described by former Chief Judge Judith Kaye.250 The DeVera ma-
jority’s approach fails to consider the full scope of legislative intent in the 
UPK law, which emphasizes quality standards while including multiple 
providers to broaden UPK access. In doing so, the majority ignores the 
public law norms and values implicated and the priority among them.251 
In the broader context of privatization in public education, “public 
law norms include constitutional principles, statutory requirements, pub-
lic oversight, and democratic accountability.”252 The language of “public 
law values” is used here to refer to basic values of fairness, equality, ex-
pertise, competence, and adherence to the rule of law, all of which hold 
government agencies accountable and work in favor of the greatest com-
mon good. Scholars have noted the significant stress that privatization 
places on public law norms and values.253 The tensions created by the 
privatization of public functions are particularly concerning in the context 
of public education, which is central to the development of informed cit-
izens in a democracy.254 
 
 249 Id. at 438. 
 250 See Kaye, supra note 214, passim. 
 251 The public law values expressed in the UPK law are focused on effective, high-quality 
pre-kindergarten education. To the extent that charter school freedom from oversight might 
also be considered a value to be addressed by the legislature, it must be considered secondary 
under the UPK law. 
 252 Natalie Gomez-Velez, Common Core State Standards and Philanthrocapitalism: Can 
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public education advocates seek to improve the quality of the public education system as a 
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This calls to mind arguments favoring public values analysis in stat-
utory interpretation, based on “the public values ideal that fundamental 
principles and norms developed through adjudication can contribute to 
the common good of our polity and to the rationality and coherence of its 
law.”255 Such an approach to statutory interpretation would emphasize 
“expanded context, the evolution of statutory principles, and the im-
portance of background understandings.”256 As legal scholar William N. 
Eskridge, Jr. explains: 
First, the interpreter should explicitly consider not just the text 
and legislative history of a statute, but also its entire public law 
context and current concepts of reasonableness and justice . . . . 
Second, the interpreter should view statutes as dynamic rather 
than static  . . . .Third, the interpreter should explicitly 
acknowledge the importance of rational background understand-
ings—public values—when she interprets statutes . . . . Public 
values have a gravitational force that varies according to their 
source (the Constitution, statutes, the common law) and the de-
gree of our historical and contemporary commitment to these val-
ues.257 
Considering Matter of DeVera from a public values perspective, the 
holistic, contextual approach taken by Commissioner Elia, the trial judge, 
and Judge Rivera is preferable to that taken by the Court of Appeals ma-
jority. This is particularly so given evidence that the legislature prioritized 
the importance of implementing UPK in a manner that supports high-
quality programming over charter school autonomy.258 It is also the better 
approach from the perspective of public law, reasonableness, and justice. 
The procedural approach taken by the SED and the DOE in imple-
menting New York City’s UPK program merits judicial deference. When 
the legislature has delegated authority to an agency to implement a statu-
tory scheme involving coordinated, shared public/private regulatory 
space, and the agency implements the statutory scheme using procedures 
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that are formalized and transparent, the agency’s determinations should 
receive deference. As Jody Freeman notes: “to the extent that agency co-
ordination takes the form of . . . decisionmaking modes characterized by 
relative transparency and formality, it will merit Chevron deference more 
often.”259 Applied here, the state legislature clearly delegated authority to 
the SED and the DOE to carry out the UPK programs. The SED estab-
lished a fairly formalized and transparent procurement and oversight pro-
cess for implementing the UPK programs.260 The DOE similarly estab-
lished a procurement process that was designed to ensure the quality 
standards set forth in the 2014 UPK law and to apply those standards con-
sistently across all UPK providers.261 
Such a deferential approach would not only hew more closely to the 
legislature’s intent under the UPK law, but would also restore an approach 
to statutory interpretation that better embodies the New York Court of 
Appeals’ role as a guardian of law and public values. 
D. Policy Implications of Matter of DeVera 
In addition to its legal implications, Matter of DeVera complicates 
UPK policy and practice in New York. Success Academy’s challenge was 
rooted in resistance to complying with the quality standards and public 
oversight required of all early childhood education providers. From a pol-
icy perspective, the importance of quality standards to an effective early 
education cannot be gainsaid. A core question in DeVera was whether the 
New York State Legislature intended that provisions of the New York 
City Charter Schools Act limiting oversight of charter schools to charter 
entities would apply to UPK programs under the 1997 and 2014 UPK 
laws. This question strikes at the heart of public education policy battles 
over quality, equity, and the degree to which privatization and deregula-
tion should take precedence over public oversight and accountability. 
Needless to say, the decision in DeVera is a setback for New York 
State’s pre-kindergarten quality and oversight structure as it applies to 
charter schools. The Success Academy challenge also raises questions 
about the charter school network’s reasons for objecting to compliance 
requirements that mark baseline standards for high-quality pre-kindergar-
ten programs. Success Academy’s complaint alleges that the SED and 
DOE requirements are too onerous for its high-quality program: 
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Success Academy, a high-quality public charter school operator, 
cannot continue the successful curriculum of its Pre-K classes if 
it is forced to accept the onerous provisions of the DOE’s contract. 
If Success Academy is forced to stop providing Pre-K classes, that 
will impose irreparable harm on families that plan to send their 
children to pre-K classes provided by Success Academy.262 
With regard to specific pre-kindergarten program issues, Success 
Academy’s Article 78 Petition touts its curriculum, instruction, teacher 
professional development, and overall strength of its programs.263 The Pe-
tition then complains about the length and detail of the DOE’s “Full-Day 
Universal Pre-Kindergarten (UPK) Contract for Charters 2015-2018,” in-
cluding the teacher training requirements, limits on the use of technology 
tools, and attendance and “short breaks” requirements.264 Success Acad-
emy’s Petition seems to quibble over baseline requirements that it claims 
its programs either meet, exceed, or approach more effectively. 
Why, then, did Success Academy decide to challenge the DOE’s 
standards, ultimately undermining UPK quality standards that would ap-
ply to all charters, instead of negotiate on the basis that its programs offer 
greater enrichment and more effective programming, and reach a com-
promise on monitoring and oversight? If Success Academy really was 
concerned with quality pre-kindergarten writ large, logic dictates that it 
would seek to collaborate with the education department, support quality 
standards, and offer assistance in the project to “lift all boats” in the pre-
kindergarten-for-all initiative. Instead, Success Academy chose litigation. 
This highlights a key problem with the “choice and competition” 
model of education. Rather than focusing on the public project of improv-
ing equitable access to high-quality UPK, the choice model seems to em-
phasize competition and deregulation. Because quality standards and 
oversight are so important to the success of pre-kindergarten, states and 
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localities should be encouraged and supported in efforts to incorporate the 
recommended, research- and evidence-based quality standards and appro-
priate public monitoring mechanisms. In short, even considering and sup-
porting the establishment and goals of charter schools, the paramount in-
terests should be equity and broad access to high-quality pre-
kindergarten. Yet neither Success Academy nor the appellate level courts 
focused on these public policy goals. Instead, the focus was on the dereg-
ulatory goals of charter schools, even in the context of UPK, where en-
suring quality standards is crucial to achieving the program’s laudable and 
urgently needed aims. 
CONCLUSION 
The outcome in Matter of DeVera calls for a clarification of the 
court’s statutory interpretation canons and a recommitment to applying 
what Judge Kaye described as concepts of “common-sense and substan-
tial justice”265 and to achieving the legislative purpose consistent with 
public values.266 It also calls for a commitment to public law norms and 
values, particularly as they relate to accountability for quality standards 
in public education in an environment that includes a range of public and 
private actors. This is particularly important in cases where statutes in-
clude various approaches to achieving quality education that require har-
monization to achieve complex legislative and public policy goals. 
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